Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue: A Discussion on Justice Stevens\u27s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence by Brownstein, Alan
Copyright  2012  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Printed  in  U.S.A. 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review Vol.  106,  No.  2 
 
 605 
CONTINUING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: 
A DISCUSSION OF JUSTICE STEVENS’S 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE 
EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
Alan Brownstein 
ABSTRACT—This Article examines Justice John Paul Stevens’s religion 
clause jurisprudence from the perspective of a continuing dialogue about 
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The 
term continuing dialogue suggests that even for as formidable and long-
tenured a jurist as Justice Stevens, important questions remain open and 
unresolved. In discussing these unanswered questions, the article explores 
potential dissonance between Justice Stevens’s contrasting interpretations 
of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. For example, 
Justice Stevens’s concern for the status and sensibilities of religious 
minorities, expressed repeatedly in his Establishment Clause opinions 
reviewing state-sponsored religious displays, plays a far less obvious and 
focused role in his free exercise jurisprudence. Yet surely minority faiths 
may suffer a similar sense of alienation when government denies them 
exemptions from general laws that burden their religious practices, but not 
those of the majority. Similarly, the opinions Justice Stevens joined limiting 
free exercise claims reject a federal judicial role that requires subjective, 
value-based balancing. Justice Stevens’s view that the Establishment Clause 
requires the evaluation of legislative accommodations to determine whether 
they unfairly favor certain faiths or extend too far and impose unacceptable 
burdens on third parties or the public, however, would seem to involve 
judges in a comparably subjective and value-laden inquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law over time is neither fixed by precedent nor 
controlled by history. It is the product of a continuing constitutional 
dialogue within the judiciary, and, more importantly, between the courts, 
the political branches of government, and the American people. There is no 
doubt that during his thirty-five-year tenure as a Justice on the United States 
Supreme Court, Justice Stevens has played a significant and valued role in 
that ongoing dialogue in many seriously contested areas of constitutional 
law. Few disputed areas, however, have involved the intensity of 
controversy or the fluidity of doctrine as the interpretation of the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 
Analyzing Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence is a difficult 
undertaking not only because of the heated and enduring debate about the 
meaning of these constitutional provisions, but also because the complexity 
of church–state issues and the numerous values subsumed by them makes it 
hard to develop coherent and effective doctrine to resolve these disputes. 
Moreover, the opinions of any Supreme Court Justice, even one who has 
been on the Court as long as Justice Stevens, provide only an incomplete 
picture of the Justice’s perspective on multifaceted constitutional questions. 
Supreme Court opinions focus on specific cases and provide only limited 
opportunities for direct exchanges between Justices or follow-up inquiries. 
The give and take of protracted argument is precluded by the form and 
function of the proceedings. There can be only so many “but what about 
this argument” inquiries directed back and forth among the written opinions 
of the majority, concurring, and dissenting Justices. 
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The goal of this Article is to attempt to continue the dialogue beyond 
the scope of Justice Stevens’s opinions and to extend our understanding of 
his religion clause jurisprudence. This Article begins by identifying the 
principles and values underlying Justice Stevens’s perspective that we can 
ascertain with some degree of confidence. That foundation will be followed 
by critical inquiries challenging the connection between these values and 
principles and various holdings and doctrine Justice Stevens supported in 
his opinions. 
So far the analysis is on fairly solid ground. At this point, however, the 
discussion will become unavoidably tentative and speculative, at least to 
some extent. There are serious rejoinders to these inquiries. The opinions 
Justice Stevens wrote or joined may give some basis for describing the 
responses he would offer, but it is impossible to determine how he would 
reply with any degree of certainty. Moreover, as the discussion progresses 
and responses to responses are considered, the relationship between what 
we know about Justice Stevens’s understanding of the religion clauses and 
the arguments presented in this Article become increasingly attenuated. 
Thus, what this Article presents is an extrapolation of the debate 
surrounding Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence that identifies 
areas of inquiry to pursue as the constitutional dialogue continues. 
Parts I, II, and III of this Article describe the substance of Justice 
Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence as it is expounded in the many 
opinions he authored or joined. Part I examines Justice Stevens’s support 
for the rigorous enforcement of Establishment Clause principles limiting the 
government’s ability to promote religion through financial subsidies and 
state-sponsored prayers or religious displays. Part II analyzes Justice 
Stevens’s less interventionist approach to free exercise claims and his 
reluctance to protect free exercise rights against neutral laws of general 
applicability that substantially burden religious practice. Part III describes 
Justice Stevens’s position that the Establishment Clause requires judicial 
vigilance in reviewing discretionary religious exemptions provided by the 
political branches of government in order to determine whether such 
accommodations go too far in imposing costs on third parties or unfairly 
favor certain faiths over others. 
The discussion in all three Parts attempts to identify the values that 
distinguish and explain Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the religion 
clauses. This analysis suggests that religious equality was Justice Stevens’s 
dominant, but not his exclusive, concern. Justice Stevens rejected state-
sponsored prayer and religious displays because they offended and 
alienated religious minorities and non-religious Americans. He challenged 
both financial and expressive promotion of religion because such state 
support increased religious fragmentation and divisions in our society to the 
disadvantage of smaller faiths. He opposed constitutionally mandated 
religious exemptions because they risked the favoring of more familiar 
faiths and the marginalization of less conventional religions. For similar 
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reasons, he argued that discretionary accommodations by the political 
branches of government must be carefully evaluated to ensure that they do 
not unfairly provide preferential protection to certain faiths while 
unacceptably burdening people of other faiths or no faith with their cost. 
In addition, Justice Stevens doubted the ability of the courts to 
competently and impartially balance free exercise rights and competing 
state interests. Such ad hoc and subjective balancing of the religious liberty 
of private individuals and groups against the public good exceeded the 
ability of judges and inappropriately intruded into legislative prerogatives. 
It also risked decisions that favored more common faiths while slighting the 
interests of less familiar religions. 
Part IV of this Article identifies unanswered questions arising out of 
Justice Stevens’s opinions and constructs a back and forth dialogue to 
discuss them. Why, we may ask, does Justice Stevens’s concern for the 
sensibilities of religious minorities and the dangers of religious divisiveness 
justify the review and invalidation of state-sponsored religious displays and 
prayers that endorse majoritarian beliefs but not laws that unnecessarily 
burden the practices of minority faiths? Isn’t it equally likely that neutral 
laws of general applicability that avoid interfering with the religious 
practices of larger faiths but substantially burden the practices of smaller 
religions will offend and alienate minorities whose right to practice their 
faith is ignored? Aren’t political debates about accommodating or refusing 
to accommodate religious practices as divisive as debates about the content 
of religious displays? 
The possible responses to these questions are varied. Even if the denial 
of free exercise accommodations causes offense and increases religious 
divisions in our society, there may be other reasons  why courts review the 
constitutionality of religious displays under the Establishment Clause yet 
assign  the evaluation of free exercise claims for accommodation to the 
political branches of government. Free exercise disputes may be harder to 
avoid than religious display cases. More importantly, their resolution may 
be more unpredictable and subjective than challenges to state-sponsored 
religious displays and public prayers. 
These explanations, however, are also subject to challenge. It is by no 
means clear that determining whether a state-sponsored religious message 
constitutes a prohibited endorsement of religion is less subjective and more 
predictable an undertaking than balancing free exercise claims against the 
state’s interests in denying requested accommodations. Moreover, some 
form of balancing of religious exercise and competing state interests may be 
an unavoidable cost under Justice Stevens’s understanding of the religion 
clauses—even if free exercise accommodation decisions are initially 
assigned to the political branches of government. Justice Stevens believes 
the federal courts have significant oversight responsibilities under the 
Establishment Clause to ensure that discretionary political accommodations 
do not unequally favor certain faiths over others or go too far in burdening 
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nonbeneficiaries with their cost. It is not at all clear that courts can fulfill 
those responsibilities without engaging in the same kind of a subjective and 
value-laden analysis that is intrinsic to the adjudication of free exercise 
claims. 
Part IV does not attempt to definitively answer these questions. Its goal 
is to present a constitutional dialogue addressing the unresolved issues 
inspired by Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence. 
I. RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONSTRAINTS 
ON GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF RELIGION 
There is no doubt that Justice Stevens viewed the Establishment Clause 
as a formidable constitutional barrier to the government’s promotion of 
religion. Justice Stevens’s commitment to the “no aid” principle restricting 
government subsidies to religious institutions and activities was broad-
based and unwavering. More than any of his brethren, he insisted that laws 
must have a clear or primary secular purpose. He was equally adamant in 
arguing that in most cases, state-sponsored prayer and religious displays 
impermissibly endorsed certain religious beliefs and communities while 
disfavoring others. The values underlying these interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause reflected both religious liberty and religious equality 
interests, but Justice Stevens clearly emphasized equality more than liberty 
as the controlling concern of his jurisprudence. 
A. No Aid to Religion Means NO Aid to Religion 
Justice Stevens supported the rigorous enforcement of Establishment 
Clause principles restricting government’s ability to subsidize religious 
institutions and activities. In cases involving financial aid to religion, 
particularly to religious schools, Justice Stevens insisted that the wall 
separating church and state should be high, consistently enforced, and 
virtually impregnable.1 It did not matter whether aid was direct or whether it 
depended on the independent choice of private individuals—government 
funds could not be used to subsidize religious education.2 Aid to religious 
colleges was suspect as well as aid to elementary or secondary schools.3 Aid 
 
1  See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265–66 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only case in which Justice Stevens voted to 
uphold state aid to religion was Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 482 (1986), which upheld a state program providing financial assistance to a blind person who 
wanted to study at a Christian college to pursue a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth director. 
2  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 685 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
3  See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404–05 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., 
dissenting); Roemer, 426 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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that served important secular goals, such as fire prevention, could not be 
provided to religious institutions if it assisted their religious mission.4 
Justice Stevens sharply criticized the Court’s ad hoc and incoherent 
willingness to uphold some aid programs while striking down others instead 
of adhering to the inflexible “no aid” principle the Constitution required.5 
The justifications for Justice Stevens’s commitment to an 
insurmountable barrier to government aid to religion are less clearly stated 
than the consistent “no aid” position he endorsed. If we look at the opinions 
Justice Stevens authored, we note two particular rationales for prohibiting 
aid to religion. First, state aid to religious institutions made them dependent 
on government support and vulnerable to state control. Thus, in Roemer v. 
Board of Public Works, Justice Stevens emphasized “the pernicious 
tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their 
religious mission without wholly abandoning it.”6 In Wolman v. Walter, he 
pointed to several aid provisions which illustrated this concern. For 
example, in order “[t]o qualify for aid, sectarian schools must relinquish 
their religious exclusivity” in admitting students or hiring teachers.7 In 
addition, Justice Stevens explained, “sectarian schools will be under 
pressure to avoid textbooks which present a religious perspective on secular 
subjects, so as to obtain the free textbooks provided by the State.”8 
Second, Justice Stevens believed that the use of state funds to subsidize 
religion would contribute to religious divisions in our society as different 
religious factions sought to maximize their access to government support. 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Stevens referred to religious strife in Europe 
that led to early immigration to America and to religious conflicts in 
various parts of the world today.9 “Whenever we remove a brick from the 
wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the 
risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.”10 
Finally, if we expand our inquiry to include opinions that Justice 
Stevens joined, we see that Justice Stevens identified a third justification for 
prohibiting state aid to religion: protecting the taxpayer’s liberty interest in 
not subsidizing the promulgation of religion, particularly faiths other than 
his own. “[C]ompelling an individual to support religion violates the 
fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. Madison’s and Jefferson’s 
now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction 
 
4  See Regan, 444 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5  Wolman, 433 U.S. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
6  426 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
7  Wolman, 433 U.S. at 266 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
8  Id. 
9  536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
10  Id. 
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requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means that the 
government can compel no aid to fund it.”11 
These justifications for the demanding “no aid” principle that Justice 
Stevens endorsed are seldom emphasized when the Justice’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence is described and evaluated.12 As will be evident 
shortly, many of Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause opinions focus on 
religious equality as a critical constitutional value and goal.13 The 
foundation for Justice Stevens’s position prohibiting state aid to religion, 
however, is religious liberty—the liberty of the taxpayer who challenges the 
government’s use of her tax dollars to subsidize other faiths, and the liberty 
of religious institutions and communities to be free from the dependency 
and control that inevitably follows the acceptance of government support.14 
B. The Secular Purpose Requirement 
Justice Stevens interpreted the Establishment Clause to require the 
invalidation of laws that lacked a “clearly” or “primary” secular purpose.15 
A law’s purpose under his analysis did not require an inquiry into the 
personal religious beliefs of the legislator. Thus, the fact that a legislator 
believed that free speech is a good thing for religious reasons would not 
require the invalidation of statutes facilitating speech under the 
Establishment Clause.16 The utility and purpose of statutes facilitating 
speech can be explained without acknowledging the value or truth of 
religious beliefs. Also, the fact that a law resulted in some incidental secular 
consequences did not establish the law’s secular purpose.17 A law requiring 
school children to recite Protestant prayers at public school would not be 
understood to serve a secular purpose because of the perceived promotion 
of moral values that result from doing so.18 Such a law presupposed the 
 
11  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); accord 
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “no one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever’” (alteration in original) (quoting THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779))); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Using public funds for the 
direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment 
Clause . . . .”); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Treating Religion as Speech: Justice Stevens’s Religion 
Clause Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2006). 
12  See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal 
Membership, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2006) (discussing the equality-based principles of Justice 
Stevens’s and Justice O’Connor’s religion clause jurisprudence). 
13  See infra notes 28–64 and accompanying text. 
14  See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
15  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 284–86 nn.19 & 21 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
16  See id. at 285 n.21. 
17  See id. at 286 n.21. 
18  See id. 
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value of religious observance or the truth of religious belief as the basis for 
achieving such benefits. To Justice Stevens, a challenged law serves a 
religious purpose if it “reflects a judgment that it would be desirable for 
people to be religious or to adhere to a particular religion.”19 
The methodology a court may employ to determine whether or not a 
law has a secular purpose raises numerous issues,20 most of which are 
beyond the scope of this Article. A less obvious, but equally important, 
question might focus on the nature of the interest that is burdened when 
government adopts laws that serve religious purposes. Because Justice 
Stevens takes a particularly aggressive position in evaluating laws alleged 
to lack a secular purpose, this issue is more difficult to answer for Justice 
Stevens’s jurisprudence than it is for other Justices who interpret this 
Establishment Clause requirement more narrowly. 
For example, Justice Stevens was the lone member of the Court who 
argued that some laws restricting a woman’s ability to choose to have an 
abortion violated the Establishment Clause because the laws lacked a 
secular purpose. In essence, Justice Stevens argued that no secular 
arguments exist supporting a state’s position that protecting fetal life is 
equally compelling from conception to birth,21 or that there is a reason to 
differentiate between contraceptives that prevent fertilization and devices 
that prevent the implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterine wall.22 
Given the frequently asserted theological arguments supporting these 
contentions, Justice Stevens concluded that laws grounded on either 
assumption further religious rather than secular purposes.23 
 
19  Id. 
20  See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861–64 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, 
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 98–102 (2002) (discussing four objections to the secular purpose 
requirement). 
21  See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., concurring), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
22  See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563–66 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
23  Id. at 566–69. 
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Putting aside the merits of Justice Stevens’s analysis,24 we can ask 
what constitutionally cognizable harm is done if his analysis is correct and 
if certain antiabortion laws serve a religious purpose. One answer focuses 
on religious liberty concerns. The state cannot require individuals to 
conform their decisions about how they want to live their lives to the tenets 
of a particular religious faith. This aspect of a secular purpose analysis 
resonates with the Court’s language in Epperson v. Arkansas (affirmed in 
Edwards v. Agullard25) that “the First Amendment does not permit the State 
to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or 
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”26 In the context of laws 
prohibiting abortion, one might paraphrase this quote to state that the First 
Amendment does not permit the State to require that a woman’s decision 
whether or not to bear a child must be tailored to the principles or 
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.27 
While the secular purpose requirement may protect individual liberty 
in some cases, in many other circumstances it primarily protects religious 
equality. Indeed, equality concerns appear to be the controlling interest in 
several secular purpose opinions that Justice Stevens has written or joined. 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, for example, Justice Stevens 
argued that the preamble to a Missouri statute defining conception violated 
the Establishment Clause because it lacked a secular purpose even if the 
statutory language “merely makes legislative findings without operative 
effect.”28 A law without operative effect cannot abridge liberty, but it can 
offend religious equality principles. The language in the Missouri statute 
was unconstitutional because it was “an unequivocal endorsement of a 
religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths,”29 and injected 
 
24  There is significant philosophical debate about the morality of abortion, which extends beyond 
exclusively theological arguments. See generally JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING 
LIVES (reprt. 1990) (discussing moral and philosophical problems around killing, including the issues of 
abortion, infanticide, war, and euthanasia); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, BEGINNING LIVES (reprt. 1988) 
(discussing and seeking to refute several of the prevailing moral philosophical positions in support of 
abortion); L.W. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY (1981) (discarding extreme liberal and 
conservative views on abortion in favor a moderate approach and defending utilitarianism as a 
philosophical rationale for a moderate view); THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION (Susan Dwyer & Joel 
Feinberg eds., 1997) (collecting essays on both sides of the philosophical debate surrounding abortion); 
WHAT IS A PERSON? (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988) (collecting essays on the philosophical 
underpinnings of personhood and their relationship to the abortion debate). 
25  482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987). 
26  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
27  The secular purpose requirement also arguably protects a liberty interest in meaningful 
participation in the political development of law. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of 
the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993). 
28  492 U.S. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29  Id. at 566. 
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the state legislature’s “endorsement of a particular religious tradition” into 
the abortion debate.30 
Similarly, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, striking down an Alabama statute requiring elementary school 
children to observe a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer 
on the grounds that the law lacked a secular purpose.31 Because the 
compliance of children with this statute cannot be observed and policed—
the teacher can determine if they are silent but not what they are thinking—
it is difficult to argue that this law burdened religious liberty in any 
meaningful sense. The constitutional defect in the law is grounded in 
equality, not liberty, concerns. Thus, Justice Stevens explained that the 
statute served a religious purpose because it “was enacted to convey a 
message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer.”32 Rather than 
maintaining a posture of neutrality toward religion, the state’s intention in 
adopting this statute was “to characterize prayer as a favored practice.”33 
Justice Stevens’s long discussion of the secular purpose requirement in 
his dissent in Board of Education v. Mergens34 is also based on equality 
principles. Justice Stevens argued that the congressional focus in enacting 
the Equal Access Act, which required local school districts to permit 
student religious groups to meet on secondary school premises, raised 
serious questions about the statute’s secular purpose.35 Ultimately, however, 
the equal treatment required by the law satisfied his concerns. The 
Establishment Clause does not prohibit Congress or local school districts 
from “bring[ing] organized religion into the schools so long as all groups, 
religious or not, are welcomed equally.”36 
Religious equality is also the cornerstone of the Court’s inquiry into 
government purpose in religious display cases. Justice Souter’s majority 
opinion in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, which Justice Stevens 
joined, emphasized the connection between the requirement that laws must 
have a secular purpose and the constitutional commitment to neutrality 
among faiths and between religion and irreligion.37 Thus, Justice Souter 
explained that the secular purpose requirement “aims at preventing 
[government] from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of 
promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.”38 The Ten 
 
30  Id. at 571. 
31  472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985). 
32  Id. at 59. 
33  Id. at 60. 
34  496 U.S. 226, 285–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
35  See id. at 287. 
36  Id. at 288. 
37  545 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2005). 
38  Id. at 860 (alteration in original) (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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Commandments display at issue failed this requirement because it 
expressed a clear preference for particular religious beliefs. To the majority, 
a reasonable observer viewing the display in context “could only think that 
the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ 
religious message.”39 
Unlike his reasoning in state-aid-to-religion cases, Justice Stevens’s 
discussion of the secular purpose requirement emphasized religious equality 
over religious liberty concerns. Laws that served religious purposes 
typically favored religious believers over nonbelievers or adherents of 
certain faiths over others. As the next section demonstrates, however, 
Justice Stevens’s commitment to religious equality and his challenge to 
laws that marginalized and alienated religious minorities were most 
vigorously asserted in cases involving state-sponsored prayer or religious 
displays. 
C. The Anti-Endorsement Presumption Against State-Sponsored Prayer 
and Religious Displays 
Secular purpose analysis aside, Justice Stevens’s commitment to 
religious equality is particularly evident in his opinions reviewing religious 
displays on public property or government-sponsored prayer. To Justice 
Stevens, government-sponsored religious displays or prayers necessarily 
expressed a message favoring some faith or faiths over others. Such state 
affirmation of certain religions and disrespect of others fragments citizens 
along religious lines and increases religious divisiveness in our society. For 
these reasons, Justice Stevens argued for a strong presumption against the 
display of religious symbols on public property or government-sponsored 
prayers at public events. 
This position permeates Justice Stevens’s opinions and those he joined. 
For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the case upholding a government-
sponsored Christmas display including a nativity scene as well as less 
sectarian Christmas symbols, Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s and 
Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinions.40 Justice Brennan argued that the 
nativity scene “serves to reinforce the sense that the city means to express 
solidarity with the Christian message of the crèche and to dismiss other 
faiths as unworthy of similar attention and support.”41 Justice Blackmun 
argued similarly against upholding the inclusion of the nativity scene 
because “non-Christians [would] feel alienated by its presence.”42 
Much more often, Justice Stevens spoke in his own voice. In Marsh v. 
Chambers, he dissented from the Court’s decision upholding the 
 
39  Id. at 869. 
40  465 U.S. 668, 670–72 (1984). 
41  Id. at 713 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
42  Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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appointment of a chaplain selected by a Legislative Council and paid with 
public funds to offer prayers at the beginning of each session of the 
Nebraska state legislature.43 Commenting on the extended sixteen-year 
tenure of a Presbyterian minister as the legislature’s chaplain, Justice 
Stevens explained that “the designation of a member of one religious faith 
to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16 
years constitutes the preference of one faith over another in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”44 Justice Stevens chided the 
majority for its unwillingness “to acknowledge that the tenure of the 
chaplain must inevitably be conditioned on the acceptability of . . . [his 
prayers] to the silent majority.”45 
In 1989 in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 
Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s holding that a stand-alone crèche 
in a prominent location in the county courthouse violated the Establishment 
Clause.46 He dissented, however, from the holding that a large, city-
sponsored Chanukah menorah and Christmas tree outside a government 
office building did not violate Establishment Clause requirements.47 To 
Justice Stevens, government sponsorship of religious displays was 
constitutionally problematic because of the government disposition it 
communicated. Thus, he wrote, “[t]reatment of a symbol of a particular 
tradition demonstrates one’s attitude toward that tradition.”48 Such displays 
had “the purpose and effect of providing support for specific faiths”49 and 
risked “offend[ing] nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as 
adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful.”50 
Offense was not the only harm to be avoided. Government-sponsored 
religious displays were intrinsically divisive. If government can endorse 
favored religious beliefs, religious status becomes a political spoil to be 
fought over and captured by religious factions in our society. Thus, Justice 
Stevens emphasized in Allegheny County that “displays of this kind 
inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt 
differences among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The 
Establishment Clause does not allow public bodies to foment such 
disagreement.”51 
Eleven years later, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, striking down a school district 
 
43  463 U.S. 783, 822–24 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44  Id. at 823. 
45  Id. at 823–24. 
46  492 U.S. 573, 654 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 649. 
49  Id. at 650. 
50  Id. at 651. 
51  Id. 
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policy delegating to the student body the authority to decide through an 
election whether a prayer should be offered before high school football 
games and, if so, the student speaker who would deliver it.52 The 
constitutional defects and impermissible consequences resulting from this 
policy were plain to Justice Stevens: “School sponsorship of a religious 
message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to 
members of the audience who are nonadherants ‘that they are outsiders, not 
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherants that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.’”53 Moreover, the election procedure itself “encourages 
divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting, a result at odds 
with the Establishment Clause.”54 
Justice Stevens provided his most complete discussion of this issue in 
his dissenting opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, a case upholding state 
sponsorship of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the 
Texas State Capitol.55 Put simply, he explained, “the Establishment Clause 
demands . . . [that] government may not exercise a preference for one 
religious faith over another.”56 This constitutional mandate requires 
government to treat members of all faiths with equal respect. The state 
cannot provide “comfort, even inspiration, to many individuals who 
subscribe to particular faiths,” while simultaneously offending nonmembers 
of those faiths who are treated as if their beliefs are of lesser worth.57 
For Justice Stevens, this command is universal. Forcefully rejecting 
Justice Scalia’s contention that the Constitution permits state preferences 
for monotheistic messages, Justice Stevens insisted that the Establishment 
Clause applies with equal force to all religions.58 Texas cannot 
constitutionally endorse the scriptural message of the Ten Commandments 
and its proclamation of the divinity of the “Judeo-Christian God” because 
doing so would exclude “polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as well as 
nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism.”59 Equal status and respect was 
also guaranteed to those who reject religious beliefs. To Justice Stevens, 
“the Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it 
does for the adherent of a Christian faith.”60 
To Justice Stevens, religious majorities deserved no special 
recognition. The people of the United States are diverse in their religious 
 
52  530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000). 
53  Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
54  Id. at 311. 
55  545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005). 
56  Id. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57  Id. at 708. 
58  See id. at 728–29. 
59  Id. at 719. 
60  Id. at 711. 
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and secular beliefs.61 Accordingly, the state’s “propagation of an 
unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of piety would . . . make 
nonmonotheists and nonbelievers ‘feel like [outsiders] in matters of faith, 
and [strangers] in the political community.’”62 The Establishment Clause 
exists to prevent this kind of state-induced alienation and marginalization. 
Most recently, in his dissent in Salazar v. Buono,63 Justice Stevens 
summarized his position on government-sponsored religious displays and 
prayers succinctly. Justice Stevens wrote: 
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or “promotion,” the 
essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very 
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of 
religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to 
a person’s standing in the political community.”64 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Justice Stevens interpreted 
the Establishment Clause to impose serious constraints on government’s 
ability to promote religion. His adherence to these principles, particularly 
his advocacy for rigorous enforcement of the secular purpose requirement 
and a presumption against state-sponsored prayer and religious displays, 
reflected Justice Stevens’s commitment to protecting religious minorities 
and nonbelievers against unequal treatment and the disparagement of their 
status in the community. These concerns for minority sensibilities, 
however, did not extend to the rigorous review of free exercise claims 
against neutral laws of general applicability. 
II. FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS: EVALUATING LIBERTY CLAIMS 
THROUGH AN EQUALITY PRISM 
Justice Stevens strongly supported judicial vigilance and intervention 
in support of Establishment Clause requirements. He was less supportive of 
judicial intervention to enforce free exercise rights. Indeed, because of this 
ostensible difference in constitutional commitment, Justice Stevens’s free 
 
61  See id. at 720; see also BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
IDENTIFICATION SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT 5, 23 (2009), available at http://livinginliminality.files.
wordpress.com/2009/03/aris_report_2008.pdf (presenting statistics showing an increase in the 
percentage of Americans who identify as members of a non-Christian religion or as having no religion at 
all in the last twenty years); PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-
full.pdf (noting that the United States “is on the verge of becoming a minority Protestant country”). 
According to the Pew survey, there are over 140 religions in the United States, including divisions 
within religious sects. 
62  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 720 (alterations in original) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
63  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1828–42 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (evaluating the 
constitutionality of a state divestment of public land on which a cross is displayed). 
64  Id. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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exercise jurisprudence is sometimes described as entirely one-sided and 
negative in its approach to religious liberty.65 
That normative generalization does not adequately describe the case 
law. In free exercise cases, Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in 
supporting free exercise claims in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division66 and Frazee v. Illinois Department of 
Employment Security,67 and he concurred in the judgment in Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Commission.68 He joined the dissent in O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz to argue for greater protection of the religious liberty of 
prisoners.69 He was the only member of the Court who joined the entirety of 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, including the section focusing on the invidious legislative intent 
of the Hialeah City Council.70 On the other hand, he concurred with the 
majority of the Court in rejecting free exercise claims in Lee v. Weisman,71 
Goldman v. Weinberger,72 and Bowen v. Roy,73 and joined majority opinions 
rejecting free exercise claims in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. 
Secretary of Labor,74 Hernandez v. Commissioner,75 Jimmy Swaggart 
Ministries v. Board of Equalization76 and Bob Jones University v. United 
States.77 Justice Stevens also wrote the majority opinion in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith (Smith I)78 and joined 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith (Smith II).79 
This is not a record of unfailing rejection of free exercise exemptions. 
Still, far more often than not, Justice Stevens voted to deny free exercise 
 
65  See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Justice Stevens’s opinion as “bristl[ing] with hostility to all things religious in public life”); 
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 993, 1010 (1990) (“The apparent explanation for [Justice Stevens’s] voting pattern is hostility to 
religion.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 17–18 (1997) 
(claiming that Justice Stevens, “of course, is implacably hostile to religion”). Other commentators have 
described Justice Stevens as “relentlessly secularist.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place 
of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 48 n.48 (2002). 
66  450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
67  489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
68  480 U.S. 136, 147–48 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
69  482 U.S. 342, 354–68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70  508 U.S. 520, 540–41 (1993). 
71  505 U.S. 577, 599–609 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
72  475 U.S. 503, 510–13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
73  476 U.S. 693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
74  471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
75  490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
76  493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
77  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
78  485 U.S. 660 (1988). 
79  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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claims challenging neutral laws of general applicability. This imbalance in 
results certainly is a proper place to begin an inquiry into Justice Stevens’s 
free exercise jurisprudence. 
When we examine Justice Stevens’s written opinions, two striking 
points become apparent. First, for Justice Stevens, equality concerns are the 
primary, if not the only, acceptable foundation that supports judicial 
intervention to protect the free exercise of religion. There is virtually no 
discussion of the need to protect religious practice and autonomy as a 
liberty interest. In 1982, Justice Stevens concurred with the majority in 
United States v. Lee and rejected the free exercise claim of an Amish 
employer who sought an exemption from having to pay Social Security 
taxes for his employees.80 In his concurring opinion, however, he argued for 
a different standard of review than the one applied by the majority. Rather 
than evaluating the cost and risk of granting the claimed exemption and 
concluding that it was unacceptable in this case, Justice Stevens argued the 
Court should hold “that there is virtually no room for a ‘constitutionally 
required exemption’ on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is 
entirely neutral in its general application.”81 
Justice Stevens recognized that his position was in “tension” with the 
Court’s holdings in Thomas and Sherbert v. Verner, two cases mandating 
the award of unemployment compensation benefits to individuals whose 
adherence to their religious beliefs required them to leave their jobs.82 The 
holdings in Thomas and Sherbert, however, could be defended on equality 
rather than religious liberty grounds. Justice Stevens explained that by 
analogizing employees with a religious reason for leaving their jobs to 
employees with physical impairments that made it impossible for them to 
work under changed circumstances, the Court’s decisions “could be viewed 
as a protection against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored 
treatment for the members of the religious sect.”83 
Four years later, in Bowen, Justice Stevens concurred in the Court’s 
rejection of a free exercise claim challenging the use of a child’s Social 
Security number as a precondition to her receiving welfare benefits to 
which she was otherwise entitled.84 Recognizing that the child’s parents 
might raise additional free exercise claims in the future if they were 
required to file forms containing the child’s Social Security number, Justice 
Stevens explained that that these problems might be resolved under an 
equality analysis.85 Accommodations are available for those who experience 
difficulties in filling out required forms because of mental, physical, or 
 
80  455 U.S. 252, 254–61 (1982). 
81  Id. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
82  Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 399–404 (1963). 
83  Lee, 455 U.S. at 263–64 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
84  476 U.S. 693, 716–23 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
85  See id. at 720–21. 
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linguistic handicaps.86 Accordingly, “it would seem that a religious inability 
should be given no less deference [because] our recent free exercise cases 
suggest that religious claims should not be disadvantaged in relation to 
other claims.”87 
The following year, in Hobbie, another unemployment compensation 
case, Justice Stevens’s concurrence echoed these equality arguments.88 
Here, Florida violated the plaintiff’s free exercise rights by treating the 
plaintiff’s “religious claims less favorably than other claims.”89 Therefore, a 
constitutional accommodation was “necessary to protect religious observers 
against unequal treatment.”90 
The second point that becomes apparent when examining Justice 
Stevens’s written opinions is that in addition to focusing on equality values 
as the basis for providing protection to free exercise rights in a limited class 
of cases, Justice Stevens identified equality concerns as his primary 
justification for rejecting any broader judicial intervention in support of 
religious liberty.91 Thus, counterintuitive as it may seem initially, Justice 
Stevens acknowledges protecting religious liberty more often as a goal of 
the Establishment Clause than as a purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.92 
Equality, not liberty, is the foundation of his free exercise jurisprudence. 
Justice Stevens provides the most complete explanation of why his 
concerns about religious equality require the denial of free exercise 
exemptions in Goldman.93 Captain Goldman, an Air Force Officer and 
Orthodox Jew, sought an exemption from the military’s uniform dress code 
requirements to allow him to wear a yarmulke, a small cap or head 
covering, required by his faith.94 The military did not prohibit servicemen 
from wearing any religious apparel, but appeared to distinguish between 
visible and nonvisible apparel, permitting only the latter.95 A yarmulke 
apparently crossed the line and was visible enough to be prohibited. 
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion rejecting 
Goldman’s free exercise claim.96 He argued that granting this exemption 
would create an unacceptable risk that military personnel from other faiths 
 
86  See id. at 721. 
87  Id. at 722. 
88  480 U.S. 136, 147–48 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
89  Id. at 148 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 722 n.17). 
90  Id. 
91  Indeed, as will be discussed in the next section, a similar emphasis on equality concerns seems to 
control his decision to uphold or strike down discretionary legislative accommodations of religion. See 
infra Part III. 
92  See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
93  475 U.S. 503, 510–13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
94  Id. at 504–05 (majority opinion). 
95  See id. at 508–10. 
96  See id. at 510–13 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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would not receive neutral and uniform treatment with regard to their 
requests for comparable exemptions.97 As Justice Brennan’s dissenting 
opinion acknowledged, the Constitution does not prohibit the armed forces 
from imposing uniform dress requirements on military personnel, nor does 
it mandate the granting of all requests for exemptions by members of 
minority faiths obliged by their faith to wear religious apparel.98 To Justice 
Brennan, this suggested a free exercise analysis pursuant to which some 
requests could be granted and others denied under a multifactor analysis 
taking into account the military’s concerns about “functional utility, health 
and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional 
appearance.”99 From Justice Stevens’s perspective, however, the application 
of that kind of a standard would inevitably result in personnel from some 
faiths being denied exemptions while the religious obligations of members 
of other faiths would be accommodated.100 Distinctions in the award of 
accommodations among Jews wearing yarmulkes, Sikhs wearing turbans, 
and Rastafarians wearing dreadlocks would necessarily reflect the 
majority’s attitudes toward the faith seeking an exemption.101 Neither the 
military nor the Court has any business in drawing such distinctions.102 The 
challenged policy avoided this risk because it “[was] based on a neutral, 
completely objective standard—visibility.”103 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Smith II104 in 1990 vindicated the 
position Justice Stevens had endorsed in his concurring opinions in United 
States v. Lee105 and Goldman v. Weinberger.106 Free exercise claims could 
not be asserted against neutral laws of general applicability,107 no matter 
how substantial the burden on religious practice might be or how 
unimportant the state’s justification for refusing to grant an 
accommodation.108 The Free Exercise Clause only came into play when the 
 
97  See id. at 512–13.   
98  See id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
99  Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
100  See id. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
101  See id. Justice Blackmun agreed that basing the criteria for accommodation on whether or not 
religious apparel or grooming was consistent with a polished and professional appearance would result 
in discriminatory treatment in favor of mainstream religions and familiar faiths. See id. at 526–27 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
102  See id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
103  Id. 
104  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
105  455 U.S. 252, 261–64 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
106  475 U.S. at 510–13 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra notes 80–83, 103–10 and 
accompanying text. 
107  See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 879. 
108  Cf. id. at 911, 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the state’s interest in restricting the use 
of peyote for religious purposes as “the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition” that, if 
taken seriously, could have a “potentially devastating impact” on respondents’ religion). 
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state singled out religion or a particular faith for discriminatory treatment.109 
After Smith II, for free exercise purposes, religious equality was the only 
constitutional game in town.110 
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,111 Justice 
Stevens demonstrated the strength of his commitment to religious equality 
in free exercise cases and how it was informed by equal protection 
principles. In Hialeah, the Court struck down a series of municipal 
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices.112 Decided after Smith II, the 
Hialeah decision necessarily grounded its analysis on religious 
discrimination against a particular faith, in this case Santeria, an Afro-
Cuban religion that uses slaughtered animals in rituals and ceremonies.113 
While the challenged regulations were not discriminatory on their face, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasized that the ordinances prohibiting 
animal sacrifices constituted an impermissible “religious gerrymander.”114 
That analysis drew support from a clear majority of the Court.115 Justice 
Kennedy extended his argument, however, to include a section explicitly 
grounded in equal protection concerns.116 Quoting from the record of the 
City Council meeting at which the challenged ordinances were adopted, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that the city’s actions were invidiously 
motivated to suppress the Santeria faith.117 No Justice other than Justice 
Stevens joined this section of Justice Kennedy’s opinion.118 
While Justice Stevens interpreted the Free Exercise Clause so narrowly 
that it provided religious individuals and institutions no protection against 
neutral laws of general applicability, he recognized that the political 
branches of government might grant religious accommodations in 
appropriate circumstances. These discretionary accommodations, however, 
must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that they did not violate 
Establishment Clause requirements. Here, again, religious equality was 
Justice Stevens’s primary, although not his exclusive, concern. 
 
109  See id. at 877 (majority opinion); see also id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (assuming that 
the majority viewed free exercise analysis as only applicable “to laws that expressly single out religious 
practices”). 
110  See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 
(1992) (explaining that the Smith II decision “converts a constitutionally explicit liberty into a 
nondiscrimination requirement”). 
111  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
112  Id. at 524–28. 
113  Id. at 525. 
114  Id. at 535 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
115  Id. at 522. 
116  See id. at 540–42. 
117  See id. 
118  Id. at 522. 
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III. THE RIGOROUS REVIEW OF DISCRETIONARY ACCOMMODATIONS 
If we focus exclusively on the holdings of discretionary religious 
accommodations cases, Justice Stevens’s decisions provide no clear sense 
of direction. Justice Stevens joined the majority opinions in Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos119 and Cutter v. Wilkinson120 upholding accommodation statutes. He 
wrote a concurring opinion supporting striking down the religious 
accommodation in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School 
District v. Grumet121 and joined the majority of the Court in invaliding 
accommodations in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,122 Larson v. 
Valente,123 and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.124 
These mixed results should not be entirely surprising. The decision to 
reject free exercise claims in Smith II,125 after all, neither predicts nor 
controls judicial review of discretionary accommodations under 
Establishment Clause auspices. Smith II certainly does not require the 
invalidation of discretionary government accommodations of the exercise of 
religion. It explicitly acknowledges the possible legitimacy of such 
accommodations by assigning the task of determining when particular 
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability should be granted to 
the political branches of government, rather than the judiciary.126 Thus, a 
Supreme Court Justice who joined the majority opinion in Smith II could 
interpret the Establishment Clause to require only superficial and 
deferential review of the granting of such accommodations. Under this 
analysis, allocating responsibility for protecting religious liberty to the 
political branches of government required, or at least permitted, the Court to 
refrain from the kind of indeterminate balancing that the Smith II decision 
sought to avoid. This appears to be the Establishment Clause framework 
that Justice Scalia has adopted. He has voted to uphold every religious 
accommodation brought before the Court that was challenged for violating 
the Establishment Clause.127 
 
119  483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
120  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
121  512 U.S. 687, 711–12 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
122  472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
123  456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
124  489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
125  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
126  See id. at 890. 
127  See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. 
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–45, 752 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment 
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 631 (2011) (“In his almost twenty-five years on the Court, Justice Scalia 
has never joined a majority to strike down a government action on Establishment Clause grounds.”). 
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Justice Stevens took a very different approach. He reviewed religious 
accommodations far more rigorously than Justice Scalia and voted to strike 
down accommodations in Kiryas Joel,128 Estate of Thornton,129 Larson,130 
and Texas Monthly131 on Establishment Clause grounds. Moreover, Justice 
Stevens was the lone member of the Court to argue in City of Boerne v. 
Flores that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) constituted an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion.132 Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice 
Stevens recognized that the Court must exercise vigilant oversight in 
reviewing discretionary accommodations to determine whether they are 
consistent with Establishment Clause guarantees.  
Justice Stevens did not contend that all exemptions are unconstitutional 
per se, however. As noted previously, he voted to uphold accommodations 
in Amos133 and Cutter.134 He also spoke approvingly of the legitimacy of 
some religion-specific accommodations in his dissent in Board of 
Education v. Mergens.135 As Justice Stevens explained, a law serves a 
permissible and “proper” purpose if it is designed to lift “a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, even if the resulting exemption does not 
‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’”136 Most recently, Justice 
Stevens joined the Court’s opinion interpreting RFRA in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, although that case did not 
involve an Establishment Clause challenge to RFRA’s constitutionality.137 
Because Justice Stevens recognized that the Court has important 
responsibilities under the Establishment Clause to monitor the 
constitutionality of discretionary religious accommodations, he and like-
minded Justices had to develop a framework for adjudicating 
accommodations cases. Doing so was not an easy task. Indeed, if we look at 
the few opinions Justice Stevens authored in reviewing laws granting 
 
128  512 U.S. at 711–12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking a New York law that created a school 
district for a village dominated by one religious group). 
129  472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985) (striking Connecticut law that gave employees “an absolute and 
unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designate as their Sabbath”). 
130  456 U.S. 228, 256–58 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking a Minnesota law that imposed 
registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations that solicited more than fifty percent 
of their funds from nonmembers). 
131  489 U.S. at 5 (striking a Texas law exempting religious periodicals from sales tax). 
132  521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. 
133  483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987) (upholding section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
allows religious nonprofit employers to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring employees). 
134  544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s 
institutionalized-persons provision). 
135  496 U.S. 226, 288 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
136  Id. at 285 n.21 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 338) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137  See 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006) (applying RFRA to protect the sacramental use of a controlled 
substance). 
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religious exemptions, it is difficult to clearly identify a set of criteria to 
consider or an analytic framework to employ. 
Some of the cases seem idiosyncratic. In Kiryas Joel, for example, 
Justice Stevens argued that it violated the Establishment Clause for the state 
to carve out a special school district for a very religious Jewish sect in order 
to facilitate the religious group’s ability to provide special education 
services to its children.138 To Justice Stevens, it was unconstitutional to 
“affirmatively support[] a religious sect’s interest in segregating itself and 
preventing its children from associating with their neighbors.”139 
In other cases, Justice Stevens’s application of Establishment Clause 
principles seemed to overlap or serve as a proxy for free speech concerns. 
The accommodation in Texas Monthly, for example, exempted certain 
religious periodicals and books from a sales and use tax applicable to all 
other publications.140 Although Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s 
opinion holding that the accommodation violated the Establishment 
Clause,141 Justice White’s concurring opinion demonstrates that the content-
discriminatory statute was equally vulnerable to a Press Clause challenge.142 
Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court to argue in City of 
Boerne that the RFRA not only exceeded Congress’s power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also violated the Establishment 
Clause.143 Justice Stevens’s brief concurring opinion suggested that RFRA’s 
implicit preference for religious expression, as opposed to irreligious 
expression, contributed to this latter conclusion.144 Thus, Justice Stevens 
explained, while a religious organization using land for religious purposes, 
such as a church, could demand an exemption from local zoning laws under 
RFRA, a secular organization, such as a museum or art gallery, would not 
receive similar protection.145 Justice Stevens may have chosen these 
expressive land-use examples of unacceptable preferences for religion over 
irreligion to emphasize his concern about the state’s favoritism toward 
religious speakers in the marketplace of ideas. 
The attempt to identify critical factors that influenced Justice Stevens’s 
review of discretionary accommodations is not a futile enterprise, however. 
Notwithstanding idiosyncrasies and free speech analogies, if we look at the 
opinions Justice Stevens wrote or joined in accommodations cases, we may 
identify two constitutional concerns that are repeatedly recognized. One 
relates to religious equality, a core concern that is reflected throughout 
 
138  512 U.S. 687, 711–12 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
139  Id. at 711. 
140  489 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1989). 
141  Id. at 5. 
142  See id. at 25–26 (White, J., concurring). 
143  521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
144  See id. at 537. 
145  See id. 
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Justice Stevens’s religion clause jurisprudence.146 The other concern focuses 
on the impact of accommodations on nonbeneficiaries who bear the cost of 
regulatory exemptions.147 
To Justice Stevens, equality of treatment among faiths was essential to 
the evaluation of religious accommodations under the Establishment 
Clause. Thus, for example, Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s opinion 
striking down a discriminatory exemption in Larson.148 That analysis stated 
in ringing terms that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause 
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”149 Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s opinion striking down 
the accommodation in Kiryas Joel in part because of the risk that the 
legislature’s action in creating a separate school district for a particular 
religious faith might reflect a preference for “one religion to another, or 
religion to irreligion.”150 More importantly, in his concurring opinions in 
United States v. Lee151 and Goldman v. Weinberger,152 Justice Stevens 
emphasized the importance of nonpreferentialism for both the judiciary and 
the political branches of government. The plaintiff’s free exercise claims 
must be rejected in both cases because of the “overriding [constitutional] 
interest in keeping the government—whether it be the legislature or the 
courts—out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing 
religious claims.”153 
Another core principle employed in the review of discretionary 
accommodations is the idea that on some occasions an accommodation 
simply goes too far and imposes an unacceptable burden or risk on others. 
Here, for example, Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion in Estate of 
Thornton invalidating a Connecticut law imposing an absolute prohibition 
against employers requiring any of their employees to work on the 
Sabbath.154 The Court held that “[t]his unyielding weighting in favor of 
Sabbath observers over all other interests” violates the Establishment 
Clause.155 
Justice Stevens also joined Justice Brennan’s opinion striking down a 
Texas statute that exempted periodicals published by a religious faith and 
books consisting entirely of sacred writings from the state’s general sales 
 
146  See supra notes 28–64 and 80–118 and accompanying text. 
147  See infra notes 154–62 and accompanying text. 
148  456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). 
149  Id. at 244. 
150  512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994). 
151  See 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
152  See 475 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
153  Id. at 513 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
154  See 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985). 
155  Id. at 710. 
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and use tax requirements.156 Justice Brennan explained that this exemption 
violated the Establishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption 
constitutes a subsidy that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to 
become ‘indirect and vicarious donors.’”157 While broadly stated 
exemptions having this subsidy effect may withstand constitutional review, 
“when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations 
that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens 
nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a 
significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion,” doing so 
violates Establishment Clause guarantees.158 While it is not the sole criteria 
for invalidating a religion specific accommodation, the fact that an 
exemption “burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly” would seem to be a 
sufficient basis for striking the law down. 
Most recently, Justice Stevens joined a unanimous Court in Cutter in 
upholding the prison provisions of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against an Establishment Clause 
challenge.159 Notwithstanding the broad coverage of the statute, the rigorous 
standard of review it requires for laws that substantially burden prisoners’ 
free exercise rights, and the fact that the law did not extend to secular 
activity, the Court rejected Ohio’s contention that the RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional on its face because it impermissibly advanced religion.160 In 
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court went out of its way to describe 
the way in which RLUIPA must be interpreted in order to withstand an as-
applied challenge. 
Thus, the Court explained, “[p]roperly applying RLUIPA, courts must 
take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may 
impose on nonbeneficiaries, and they must be satisfied that the Act’s 
prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different 
faiths.”161 Later in the opinion, the Court emphasized that “[s]hould inmate 
requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose 
unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the 
effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the 
imposition. In that event, adjudication in as-applied challenges would be in 
order.”162 This cautionary language explicitly reinforces the Court’s and 
Justice Stevens’s concern that an accommodation can impose too great a 
 
156  See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). 
157  Id. at 14 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
158  Id. at 15. 
159  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
160  See id. at 720–24. 
161  Id. (citation omitted). 
162  Id. at 726. 
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burden on the public or particular third parties, or operate too unfairly and 
unequally, to withstand constitutional review. 
In a sense, both the review of accommodations to determine if they 
single out particular faiths for preferential treatment and the evaluation of 
accommodations to determine if they go too far in burdening 
nonbeneficiaries serve equality values. The former, of course, does so 
directly by invalidating denominational favoritism. The latter prevents 
government from unfairly burdening nonreligious individuals with the costs 
incurred in accommodating the religious practices of others. 
IV. CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES AND 
EXTRAPOLATIONS  
Justice Stevens’s limited commitment to protecting religious liberty 
under the Free Exercise Clause and his emphasis on equality values rather 
than liberty values in interpreting both of the religion clauses raise a host of 
questions that cannot be convincingly answered by examining Justice 
Stevens’s many opinions. Justice Stevens forcefully explained the 
foundational principles that underlay his rigorous commitment to 
Establishment Clause doctrine. He also identified the critical concerns that, 
in his judgment, cast doubt on the legitimacy and utility of judicial 
intervention to protect the free exercise of religion. The connection between 
the principles defining his Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the 
concerns he expressed about free exercise accommodations were seldom 
discussed, however. Nor did Justice Stevens’s identification and analysis of 
these concerns provide full closure to the debate in the courts and the larger 
community about the scope of free exercise rights and the legitimacy of 
discretionary accommodations. 
Justice Stevens’s writings and judicial judgments represent a powerful 
statement of a thesis that opens a debate about the meaning of the religion 
clauses and our constitutional commitment to religious liberty and equality. 
Justice Stevens’s doctrinal position supporting a vigorously enforced and 
expansive interpretation of the Establishment Clause and a much more 
limited and lenient understanding of free exercise rights is clearly stated, as 
is his emphasis on religious equality, but not religious liberty, values. But 
this description is only the beginning of the constitutional discourse on his 
jurisprudence. When we read the opinions Justice Stevens has written and 
joined, there is often no ongoing point and counterpoint or argument and 
rebuttal completing the discussion. In response to that unfinished dialectic, 
this Article attempts to continue the conversation about Justice Stevens’s 
religious liberty jurisprudence. It does so in part by identifying open 
questions that remain troubling, and in part by presenting counterpoints 
grounded in principles Justice Stevens acknowledged to be of constitutional 
significance, either directly in his own writings or indirectly by joining the 
opinions of other Justices. 
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A. Equality Challenges to the Denial of Free Exercise Exemptions 
If we return to Goldman v. Weinberger,163 the roots of an equality-
based challenge to Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence can be 
unearthed. Justice Stevens argued that beginning down the road of granting 
exemptions from the military’s dress code requirements would require the 
Court to evaluate religious practices and draw distinctions among faiths—a 
process that would inevitably raise religious equality concerns.164 Upholding 
the current neutral policy that distinguished between visible and nonvisible 
additional apparel avoided the risk of unequal treatment among faiths.165 
Justice Brennan dissented in Goldman and disputed Justice Stevens’s 
equality analysis. To Justice Brennan, there was nothing intrinsically 
neutral or evenhanded about a regulation distinguishing between visible and 
nonvisible religious apparel.166 In reality, this distinction accommodated the 
beliefs of majority religions in the United States, whose faiths do not 
require adherents to wear distinctive and obvious apparel, but ignored 
minority faiths, whose religions do impose such obligations on believers.167 
Thus, Justice Brennan argued, Justice Stevens’s contention that the 
contested dress code advances the uniform treatment of all faiths is 
mistaken “unless uniformity means uniformly accommodating majority 
religious practices and uniformly rejecting distinctive minority practices.”168 
There is a limit to the extent that Justices can engage in back-and-forth 
dialogue in their written opinions, and in this case Justice Stevens did not 
directly respond to Justice Brennan’s argument. The lack of continued 
discussion here is regrettable. This equality-based distinction between 
judicial or legislative accommodations of some, but not all, minority faiths 
and general laws that avoid the burdening of religious majorities while 
denying accommodations to all minority religions is one of the critical fault 
lines on which Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence is grounded. As 
such, it deserves a full explanation and defense. 
To be sure, Justice Stevens made it clear in Goldman and other cases 
that his primary concern in rejecting constitutionally mandated or 
discretionary religious accommodations was “keeping the government . . . 
out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious 
claims. The risk that government approval of some and disapproval of 
others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another is an 
 
163  475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
164  Id. at 511–13 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
165  See supra notes 93–103 and accompanying text. 
166  See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 520–22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
167  See id. 
168  Id. at 522. 
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important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”169 What 
is unclear is why he believes that this risk is less serious when government 
adopts general and allegedly neutral laws or policies that conform to the 
religious beliefs and practices of the majority while burdening members of 
minority faiths. There are several possible answers to this question. I am not 
certain that any of them reflect Justice Stevens’s rationale for his position. 
Continuing the constitutional dialogue here requires considerable 
extrapolation. 
One argument that ostensibly builds on Justice Stevens’s analysis in 
Goldman suggests that drafting general laws which are sensitive to the 
majority’s beliefs and practices while ignoring the interests of minority 
faiths is less likely to be perceived as religious favoritism than the granting 
of discrete exemptions to certain faiths but not others. Neutral laws of 
general applicability cause less of an affront to minorities because they are 
neutral on their face and generally applicable to everyone. Thus, the 
equality costs resulting from such laws are measured and tolerable. This 
argument, however, is also open to question. 
1. Status Disparagement and Alienation.—We cannot simply assume 
that a “no accommodations” policy denying exemptions from neutral and 
generally applicable laws to all minority faiths is less likely to be perceived 
as religious favoritism because no minority receives preferential treatment. 
As an empirical matter, this contention is certainly open to debate—with 
the important caveat that everyone’s conclusions on these issues are based 
on intuitions rather than data. Perhaps members of some minority faiths will 
understand that the denial of exemptions they seek are based on neutral and 
legitimate concerns. If the sought-after accommodation imposes serious 
burdens on third parties, for example, religious individuals may believe 
that, on balance, the exemption should be granted, while recognizing that its 
denial does not reflect bias against their community or favoritism for larger 
faiths. With regard to other exemption claims, however, as to which the 
state’s basis for rejecting the claim is insubstantial, I suspect that religious 
groups and individuals denied exemptions will experience that rejection as 
the disfavoring of their faith. The fact that other minority faiths are also 
denied accommodations will not mitigate the reality that the neutral and 
generally applicable law from which an exemption is sought avoids the 
burdening of majoritarian religious practices. 
We can extend this discussion beyond the comparison of general 
intuitions about perceptions of unequal treatment and examine the problem 
of free exercise exemptions by reference to the same concerns that 
exemplify Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As we 
 
169  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); 
accord Goldman, 475 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Air Force has “no 
business” deciding which religious modes of dress are acceptable and which are not). 
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have seen, Justice Stevens often employs Justice O’Connor’s endorsement 
test in cases involving religious displays on public property.170 That test in 
its essence is an equality mandate.171 It focuses, as do many of the opinions 
Justice Stevens has written and joined in this area, on the sensibilities and 
status of religious minorities.172 A religious display representing the tenets 
of one faith or multiple faiths offends and alienates the members of other 
religious groups.173 Such displays violate the Establishment Clause if they 
express a message of religious preferentialism that favors certain religions 
over others.174 
It is fair to ask, however, whether minority faiths experience a similar 
or even greater sense of offense, alienation, and unequal treatment when the 
government refuses to exempt them from laws that substantially burden the 
practice of their religion. Religious sensibilities may be just as injured by a 
regulation interfering with liberty as they are by a display expressing a 
message of inequality. Arguably, the adoption of general laws that avoid the 
burdening of religious practices of majority faiths while ignoring the 
interests of religious minorities also sends a message to minorities “that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community”175 that is at 
least as powerful as the message conveyed by placing majoritarian religious 
displays on public property. Surely, the decision to construct a road 
adjacent to Native American sacred sites that makes it impossible for 
believers to practice their faith may be understood to send a message of 
disrespect to the adherents of the burdened faith.176 Similarly, the refusal to 
exempt the members of Native American religions who use peyote in 
religious rituals from laws prohibiting the possession and use of this 
 
170  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1832–37 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2000); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 649 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–23 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
171  See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality: 
Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 837, 845 n.38 (2001) (listing commentary characterizing the endorsement test as focusing on 
religious equality); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the 
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 
1069 (1986) (interpreting the endorsement test as one that prohibits government from placing a “badge 
of inferiority” on religious minorities). 
172  See supra Part I.C. 
173  See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
174  See id. at 709. 
175  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
176  See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988) (holding that 
the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from constructing a road through part of a 
National Forest traditionally used for religious purposes by American Indian tribes). 
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“controlled substance”177 may be perceived as communicating the message 
that this faith’s religious practices need not be taken seriously.178 The fact 
that other minority faiths would be denied comparable accommodations 
may do little to reduce this perception. The major faiths in the United States 
have no sacred sites in this country comparable to Native American beliefs, 
and alcoholic beverages such as wine, which are used in Judeo-Christian 
rituals, are not a controlled substance despite the recognized risks 
associated with alcohol abuse.179 
Arguably, there is a symmetry of attitudes and experiences that 
underlay both Establishment and Free Exercise Clause disputes in this area. 
Legislators, judges, and administrative officials who adhere to or are 
familiar with the beliefs of the religious majority do not perceive 
government expression of commonly accepted religious messages as 
sectarian, preferential, or even religious in their content.180 Religion and 
American culture merge in a way that suggests some religious ideas are 
 
177  Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 874, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect 
ceremonial ingestion of peyote from state-controlled substance law and that employees terminated for 
work-related misconduct based on their use of the drug could be denied unemployment compensation). 
178  See GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 228–29 (2001). 
179  See Douglas Laycock, Peyote, Wine and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 4, 
1989, at 876, 877–78 (explaining that when alcohol was prohibited, there were exemptions for its use for 
sacramental purposes and that today, the use of alcohol is rarely prohibited). Alcohol abuse is much 
more prevalent in the United States than peyote abuse. According to the National Survey of Drug Use 
and Health, in 2009 1.4% of persons in the U.S. reported using peyote. Peyote: Ever Used Peyote, 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
SAMHDA/ssvd/studies/29621/datasets/0001/variables/PEYOTE (last visited June 30, 2012). By 
comparison, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than 38 million 
adults in the United States engage in binge drinking (consuming four or five alcoholic drinks in a short 
period of time). Excessive drinking “causes 80,000 deaths in the US each year and, in 2006 cost the 
economy $223.5 billion.” Binge Drinking, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/BingeDrinking/index.html. The CDC also reports that “[i]n 2009, 10,839 
people were killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for nearly one-third (32%) of all 
traffic-related deaths in the United States.” Impaired Driving: Data & Statistics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/Motorvehiclesafety/Impaired_Driving/data.html (last 
visited June 30, 2012). 
180  A blatant example of this tendency occurred in the oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, a case 
involving an Establishment Clause challenge to the use of a stand-alone cross as a World War I 
memorial. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). Justice Scalia asked incredulously, “The cross doesn’t honor 
non-Christians who fought in the war? . . . It’s erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in honor 
of all of the war dead. It’s the—the cross is the—is the most common symbol of . . . the resting place of 
the dead . . . .” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Salazar, 103 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472). When 
counsel replied, “The cross is the most common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I have been in 
Jewish cemeteries. There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew,” id. at 39, Justice Scalia responded 
that the idea that a cross only honors Christian war dead is “an outrageous conclusion,” id.; see also 
JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 
(2004) (explaining that in the American Common Schools in the late 1830s, “daily readings from the 
King James Bible, which was generally accepted by Protestants but not by Catholics and non-
Christians,” was considered to be nonsectarian). 
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simply what Americans believe.181 To members of minority faiths, however, 
generic Protestant, Christian, and other monotheistic messages are neither 
neutral nor nonpreferential. They endorse the beliefs of faiths other than 
their own and implicitly reject the religious beliefs to which they adhere.182 
Similarly, military authorities prohibiting the wearing of hats other 
than head gear that is a standard part of a military uniform may not view 
this regulation as one that discriminates in favor of Christians and against 
Orthodox Jews and Sikhs. Schools, public agencies, and public employers 
may not consciously recognize that scheduling sporting events, work 
assignments, and public programs on Saturday rather than Sunday disfavors 
religious individuals who observe Saturday as opposed to Sunday as their 
Sabbath. Not scheduling activities on Sunday is just the normal way of 
doing things.183 The open question is why this failure to recognize the 
preferential nature of government conduct requires constitutional 
intervention in the case of Establishment Clause challenges to majoritarian 
religious displays while intervention is rejected in the case of free exercise 
claims challenging preferential regulations that burden the religious 
exercise of minority faiths. 
2. Divisiveness.—Justice Stevens’s Establishment Clause concerns 
about government-sponsored religious displays and prayers were not 
limited to antipreferentialism values and a commitment to equality of status 
for all religious faiths and nonbelievers. Justice Stevens often also 
expressed serious misgivings about government decisions that increase 
religious divisiveness and bring religious differences into the political 
arena.184 Accordingly, here again we may ask whether political debates 
about accommodating religious practice are intrinsically less divisive than 
debates about public prayer and religious displays. 
 
181  See DELFATTORE, supra note 180, at 52–53; see also id. at 69–71 (describing how the New 
York Board of Regents believed that the monotheistic prayer they adopted to be recited in public schools 
was normative, nonsectarian, and “a fundamental element of American heritage and 
identity . . . [because] the beliefs it promoted were so widely shared that they did not appear to be 
doctrinal but were simply taken for granted”); Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion: 
Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 52 (1991) (explaining 
how educational leaders in the Common Schools believed that the Protestant theology taught in public 
schools was not intended to “victimize Catholics,” but was thought to be “fair to all and harmful to 
none”). 
182  See, e.g, DELFATTORE, supra note 180, at 15 (discussing how Catholics and some Protestants 
viewed generic Protestantism taught in Common Schools in the 1800s “as a distinct religious tradition, 
since it includes some faiths and excludes others”); Laycock, supra note 181, at 40, 63 (explaining that 
the crèche or nativity scene is “heretical or blasphemous to Judaism and Islam” as is praying “to or in 
the name of Christ”). 
183  See Nakashima v. Or. State Bd. of Educ., 185 P.3d 429, 433–34 (Or. 2008). 
184  See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719–
20 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–11 (2000). 
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Certainly, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the debate about 
government regulations substantially burdening religious practices and the 
granting or rejecting of requests for exemptions and accommodations have 
been intensely divisive. In some cases, the enactment of laws interfering 
with religious practice and the rejection of exemptions has reflected 
unconcealed animosity toward minority faiths. The U.S. government was 
all but at war with the Mormon Church over the issue of polygamy.185 The 
City of Hialeah was openly contemptuous of the Santeria faith.186 In other 
cases, proponents of accommodations accuse the other side of hostility 
toward religion and accommodation opponents assert the insensitive 
unwillingness of religious groups to subordinate their private prerogatives 
to the public good, as everyone else must do.187 Local battles over the 
zoning and regulation of land to be used for religious purposes are often 
bitterly contested.188 Debates over religious exemptions from civil rights 
laws result in both sides feeling threatened and marginalized.189 If avoiding 
 
185  See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 111–23 (2d ed. 
2006) (describing how the federal government sought to disenfranchise Mormons, prevent Mormon 
leaders from holding office, dissolve the corporate Church, and seize its property); Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167, 
169–72 (1992) (describing how the Mormon Church’s rejection of polygamy was necessary to ensure its 
survival). 
186  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525–28 (1993). 
187  In one such case, Winnifred Sullivan describes the intensity of feeling generated by the City of 
Boca Raton’s belated decision to enforce regulations prohibiting anything other than flat markers that 
did not extend above the ground to identify burial plots in the municipal cemetery. WINNIFRED FALLERS 
SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 13–31 (2005). A local newspaper described the 
cemetery plot owners and relatives supporting the regulations as demonstrating “fierce opposition to the 
fancy shrines that litter the city’s graveyard.” Id. at 21. They contended that “the hodgepodge of items 
[made] the place look like Coney Island.” Id. The defenders of aboveground markers were equally 
outraged. As one owner of a plot with an above ground marker protested, “[A]ll I could think in my 
mind was the beginning of the Holocaust. The first thing they did was . . . knocked down stones and 
desecrated the cemeteries. And I felt this was trodding [sic] on my religion and trodding [sic] on the 
religion of my loved one.” Id. at 44 (alterations in original). 
188  See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 97 (2005) 
(“RLUIPA has turned neighbor against neighbor and is one of the most religiously divisive laws ever 
enacted in the United States.”); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and 
Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1847–48 (2004) (“RLUIPA has generated a 
backlash against church influx by communities fearful that, once settled, congregations will have an 
unfettered ability to expand their operations without regard to local land-use concerns.”). 
189  On the intensity of the debate over religious accommodations of objectors to same-sex marriage, 
see generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas 
Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (exploring the religious freedom implications that emerge when marriage is 
expanded to include same-sex couples). Specific commentary illustrates the divisiveness of this issue. 
See, e.g., Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 205, 214 (reviewing SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra, and characterizing 
demands for religious accommodations from the perspective that “every hard-won escape from the caste 
[in which gays and lesbians have been placed] is propagandized into an attack on the liberty of the 
people who created the caste system and put you in it”); Mary Ann Glendon, Op-Ed., For Better or for 
Worse?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14 (“Gay-marriage proponents use the language of openness, 
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political divisions related to religion is a constitutional value, that concern 
may apply with considerable force to regulatory exemptions as well as 
religious displays. 
B. The Problematic Nature of Adjudicating Free Exercise Claims 
The arguments described above are hardly the last word in this 
discussion. Additional important rejoinders need to be considered. 
Continuing the dialogue even further from this point is necessary, but it is 
also increasingly attenuated from its source. Identifying and presenting 
these rejoinders draws us further and further from Justice Stevens’s 
opinions and the judgments he has joined. 
One possible response to the arguments I have presented regarding 
alienation and divisiveness is to distinguish the adjudication of claims for 
religious exemptions from challenges to government displays expressing 
religious messages. While the harms caused by burdening religious practice 
and endorsing favored faiths may be comparable in some ways, there are 
stark differences between these constitutional claims with regard to the 
ability of courts to resolve them. Even if neutral laws of general 
applicability are perceived by religious minorities to be unequal and unfair, 
there may be important institutional reasons why the courts are ill-suited to 
evaluate free exercise challenges and provide plaintiffs the remedy they 
seek.   
Two basic distinctions may help to explain the differences in doctrinal 
approach between Justice Stevens’s Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. First, it may be far more difficult and intrusive for 
courts to police regulatory interference with religious exercise than it is for 
the courts to monitor and limit government messages endorsing religion. 
The former task involves constant evaluation of the basic bread-and-butter 
work of government while the latter relates to state action that has little to 
do with the state’s core functions. Second, adjudicating free exercise claims 
may exceed the competence of courts and require them to intrude into what 
are essentially legislative prerogatives. The review of government messages 
endorsing religion avoids both of these concerns. We can consider each of 
these related arguments in turn. 
 
tolerance and diversity, yet one foreseeable effect of their success will be to usher in an era of 
intolerance and discrimination the likes of which we have rarely seen before.”). Other cases involving 
requests for exemptions often involve assertions of hostility toward a specific religion. One plaintiff in 
Smith II described his feelings about his case this way: “You go to church, and then you get 
terminated . . . . It is a continuation of being put down, of my people and our religion not being 
recognized by you newcomers. They just riled me up to the point where I’m ready for a fight. Do you 
want to fight? Okay.’” EPPS, supra note 178, at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 87 n.11 (Cal. 2004) (discussing but 
rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the California legislature “acted out of antipathy and spite toward the 
Catholic Church” in refusing to create an exemption from the Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act for 
Catholic Charities). 
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1. The Unavoidability of Burdening Religious Exercise.—The 
burdening of minority faiths by neutral and generally applicable laws is 
unavoidable in our society. The range of religious diversity in our 
communities is so vast that conflicts between law and religious practice are 
inevitable. Government cannot do its job without enacting laws that burden 
some faith’s religious practice.190 
The problem created by government-sponsored religious displays is 
arguably more limited and more susceptible to judicial management and 
resolution. Government does not need to endorse religious beliefs to carry 
out its core functions. Prohibiting endorsements does not impose costs on 
third parties.191 Thus, enforcing the Establishment Clause in religious 
display and public prayer cases interferes with government far less than 
mandating exemptions from laws. 
There is some truth to this contention, but it may be seriously 
overstated. While government does not need to endorse religion, it often 
may have legitimate reasons for expressing religious messages. Justice 
Stevens explicitly recognizes that it is constitutionally permissible for 
government to “acknowledg[e] the religious beliefs and practices of the 
American people.”192 Further, “works of art or historic memorabilia” need 
not be hidden because they contain religious content.193 Some religious 
statements by government officials are acceptable because government 
actors have a private as well as a public dimension to their lives, and the 
two cannot always be separated or differentiated.194 Although Justice 
Stevens has not opined on this issue, even strong supporters of the 
separation of church and state agree that in times of national emergency or 
calamity, government can express religious sentiments to the community.195 
Indeed, unless one believes that the Constitution requires that all 
religious references must be purged from the public life of our society (a 
position Justice Stevens clearly rejects),196 some state religious expression 
has been, is, and will continue to be a continuing part of American culture. 
 
190  See, e.g., Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“Precisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation 
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,’ . . . we cannot afford the luxury of 
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that 
does not protect [a state] interest of the highest order.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 
366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961))). 
191  See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 317–19 
(1996) (noting that government can effectively enforce its laws without determining the proper modes of 
worship or form of church governance; it is government endorsements of religion that create conflict 
and suffering). 
192  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
193  Id. 
194  See id. at 723. 
195  See William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of 
National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 31–33 (2002). 
196  See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text; infra notes 225–31 and accompanying text. 
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While state endorsements of religion may violate the Establishment Clause 
(and I largely agree with Justice Stevens that they do), endorsements do not 
come close to exhausting the set of state action communicating religious 
content. Religious expression in the public sector has a place in the 
constitutional scheme of things. Demanding that the government of the 
United States or state and local authorities completely refrain from 
communicating any religious content may be an implausible goal—just as it 
is unrealistic to insist that government regulations may never interfere with 
religious exercise. The problem here may not be as unavoidable as laws that 
burden someone’s religious practice or conduct, but religious discourse 
cannot be neatly excised from state expressive activity.197 
2. The Problem of Subjective, Value-Based Balancing.—The second 
distinction between claims for free exercise exemptions and Establishment 
Clause challenges to state religious expression may be more persuasive in 
explaining Justice Stevens’s reluctance to countenance the former cause of 
action while supporting the latter kind of claim. Conflicts between neutral 
laws of general applicability and religious exercise are not only inevitable 
in a religiously diverse society; they are also not susceptible to resolution 
through constitutionally mandated accommodations. The adjudication of 
free exercise claims seeking exemptions from general laws would require 
judges to employ unacceptably subjective and uncertain balancing tests that 
cannot be fairly or consistently administered. Subjective balancing leads to 
incoherent doctrine and unpredictable holdings. It also undermines 
separation of powers principles by all but compelling judges to rely on their 
personal values, backgrounds, and policy preferences in adjudicating cases. 
Concerns about the difficulty and impropriety of balancing free exercise 
rights and competing state interests was clearly one of the central themes of 
the Court’s opinion in Smith II, which Justice Stevens joined.198 
The policing of religious expression by government to determine 
whether it constitutes a prohibited endorsement, on the other hand, arguably 
 
197  Justice O’Connor recognized the implausibility of the government’s completely refraining from 
religious communication in the pledge of allegiance case when she stated that eradicating religious 
references entirely would “sever ties to a history that sustains this Nation even today.” See Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Using 
the constitutional shorthand of ceremonial deism, Justice O’Connor described how religious 
references—limited by their history, ubiquity, absence of worship, and lack of reference to a particular 
religion—can serve constitutionally acceptable, secular purposes. Id. at 37–44. 
Other scholars have discussed the concept at length. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The First 
Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 
520–21 (1992) (finding “safe, under any Establishment Clause ‘test,’” the observance of Christmas and 
Thanksgiving, “In God We Trust” on currency, and “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance); Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 207 n.59 (1992) (arguing that 
“we need not melt down the national currency to get rid of ‘In God We Trust’” since it is at most a de 
minimis endorsement). 
198  See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990). 
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avoids the kind of subjective balancing required by a rigorous free exercise 
regime. Indeed, it does not require any comparison of rights and competing 
state interests at all. Thus, the enforcement of this constitutional guarantee 
by the judiciary does not exceed the competence of courts or assign to 
judges the kind of policy choices that are more appropriately determined by 
the political branches of government. 
This argument is subject to two powerful rejoinders, however. First, 
judicial evaluation of state-sponsored prayers and religious displays to 
determine whether they constitute an impermissible endorsement of religion 
may be as subjective, value-laden, and unpredictable as the adjudication of 
free exercise claims under some form of rigorous scrutiny. Second, 
assigning decisions as to whether or not to grant a religious accommodation 
to the political branches of government may not avoid subjective and 
indeterminate judicial evaluations of these accommodations. Establishment 
Clause review to determine whether discretionary accommodations favor 
certain faiths over others and whether they burden nonbeneficiaries to an 
unacceptable extent may turn out to be just as value-laden and uncertain as 
the adjudication of free exercise claims in the first place. 
a. Subjectivity in policing endorsements.—It is not at all clear 
that the adjudication of free exercise claims is as uniquely vulnerable to 
concerns about unpredictability and subjectivity as the above criticism 
suggests. Determining what constitutes an impermissible endorsement or 
advancement of religion by government speech and sponsored activities 
may be as subjective, unpredictable, and value-laden a decisionmaking 
process as balancing a free exercise claim against the state’s interest in 
refusing to grant an exemption from a general law. While identifying 
prohibited endorsements of religion does not involve formal balancing, it 
requires a relatively open-ended evaluation of “social facts”199 based on the 
text and history of state action and the cultural environment200 in which the 
 
199  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Although 
evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-
based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on 
the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”). Justice Stevens clearly considered such social facts 
in his opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307–08 (2000), in which 
he examined the history and context of prayers offered at school-sponsored athletic functions in 
applying the Establishment Clause. 
200  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 775–76 (1995) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (evaluating the open nature of the forum, private 
ownership of the display, and presence of a sign disclaiming government sponsorship); Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 633–35 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (evaluating the physical setting and context of 
pluralism in which religious symbols were displayed); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (evaluating the content and overall holiday setting in which the créche was displayed in 
determining whether it endorses Christianity). 
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alleged endorsement occurs.201 That analysis has proven to be as subjective 
and unpredictable as balancing. 
The indeterminacy and subjectivity inherent in applying the 
endorsement test has been recognized by numerous commentators.202 In 
part, this is because social facts are often in the eye of the beholder. The 
reasonable objective observer, whose assessment controls the court’s 
analysis of whether an endorsement exists, has to view a religious display 
from some perspective, and the range of such perspectives in American 
society is very broad. Put simply, there does not seem to be any consensus 
on the meaning of social facts when religious displays are at issue. This 
problem is theoretically solvable: the Court could adopt one perspective 
through which all endorsement questions would be answered. But it has not 
done so, and there is little evidence that even those Justices who support the 
endorsement test can agree on its meaning or application. 
Justice O’Connor, who created the endorsement test, for example, 
disagreed with Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens as to what 
constituted an endorsement of religion in Lynch v. Donnelly,203 a case 
upholding a government sponsored and subsidized Christmas display 
including a crèche, Santa’s house, a sleigh pulled by reindeer, a wishing 
well, and other figures and structures204 against an Establishment Clause 
challenge. To Justice O’Connor, the display at issue did not endorse 
Christianity. Its purpose and effect “was not promotion of the religious 
content of the crèche but celebration of the public holiday [of Christmas] 
 
201  Even Justice Scalia resorts to his subjective understanding of social facts in reviewing the 
constitutionality of religious displays. In challenging the majority’s contention that the Ten 
Commandments display at issue advanced a particular religion because it adopted one version of the Ten 
Commandments, Justice Scalia offered two responses. First, he suggested that “the display of the Ten 
Commandments alongside eight secular documents, and the plaque’s explanation for their inclusion, 
make clear they were not posted to take sides in a theological dispute.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of 
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, he argued that 
[t]he sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely known. I doubt that most religious 
adherents are even aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I 
certainly was not). In any event, the context of the display here could not conceivably cause the 
viewer to believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal controversy. 
Id. at 909 n.12. This analysis is, obviously, a highly subjective interpretation of social facts, and one on 
which scholars disagree. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn 
and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1482–83 (2005) (describing the debate over the different 
interpretations and translations of the Ten Commandments). 
202  See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 
499, 510–21 (2002); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–35 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 148–57 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and 
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No-Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 
292–95 (1987). 
203  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690–91 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
204  Id. at 671–72 (majority opinion). 
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through its traditional symbols.”205 While the dissenting Justices did not 
adopt the endorsement test as the framework for adjudicating Establishment 
Clause disputes relating to religious displays, they left little doubt that that 
they considered the crèche display to be an unconstitutional endorsement of 
Christian beliefs. By including a nativity scene in the display, the city 
placed “the government’s imprimatur of approval on the particular religious 
beliefs exemplified by the crèche. Those who believe in the message of the 
nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit of public recognition and 
approval of their views.”206 
The disarray and differing perspectives were even more pronounced in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.207 At issue, in 
part, in this case was the constitutionality of a Pittsburgh holiday display 
identified by a sign stating “Salute to Liberty”208 and including a forty-five-
foot Christmas tree and an eighteen-foot Chanukah menorah.209 Justice 
Blackmun adopted the endorsement test and concluded that the dual display 
and sign communicated a message of “of cultural diversity” rather than an 
endorsement of Christianity and Judaism.210 In Justice Blackmun’s 
judgment, the Christmas tree was understood to be a secular symbol.211 The 
Chanukah menorah was more of a religious symbol, but in the context of 
the December holiday season both Chanukah and the menorah became 
increasingly secularized.212 The religious meaning of the menorah might 
still raise constitutional concerns about its inclusion in the display, but 
because no less religious, alternative symbol of Chanukah was available to 
celebrate the holiday in more secular terms, the display survived 
constitutional review.213 
Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Blackmun’s conclusion, but not 
with his analysis.214 She argued that Chanukah and the menorah were 
intrinsically religious.215 To Justice O’Connor, the “the specific practice in 
question in its particular physical setting and context” including the sign, 
the Christmas tree, and the menorah communicated a message of pluralism 
rather than endorsement.216 
 
205  Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
206  Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
207  492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
208  Id. at 582 (internal quotation marks omitted). The full message on the sign stated: “During this 
holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the 
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
209  Id. at 587. 
210  Id. at 619. 
211  See id. at 616–17. 
212  See id. at 617–18. 
213  See id. 
214  See id. at 632–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
215  Id. at 633–34. 
216  Id. at 636–37. 
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Justice Brennan disagreed with both Justices Blackmun and 
O’Connor.217 He suggested that it was much more likely that the menorah 
reinforced the religious significance of the Christmas tree than it was that 
the tree somehow secularized the menorah.218 More importantly, Justice 
Brennan seemed to challenge the idea that an “endorsement” of religion 
depended on the understanding of a “reasonable observer” with specific 
ideas about the context of a display.219 Such a standard, he suggested, would 
make the Court’s analysis “under the Establishment Clause look more like 
an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law.”220 
Justice Stevens wrote separately. While he eschewed identifying the 
constitutional infirmity with religious displays as “coercion,” 
“endorsement,” or “state action with the purpose and effect of providing 
support for specific faiths,”221 Justice Stevens maintained that the 
Establishment Clause creates “a strong presumption against the display of 
religious symbols on public property.”222 This presumption, however, is 
hardly conclusive, “for it will prohibit a display only when its message, 
evaluated in the context in which it is presented, is nonsecular.”223 The dual 
display in the instant case was not sufficiently nonsecular in its message to 
avoid invalidation as a double establishment of religion.224 
While the strength of the presumption against government-sponsored 
religious displays on public property advocated by Justice Stevens has the 
potential to limit the scope of this problem, it cannot eliminate uncertainty 
and subjectivity in adjudicating this class of cases. Justice Stevens’s 
analysis requires “th[e] careful consideration of context,”225 and contextual 
analysis is necessarily indeterminate. Thus, Justice Stevens recognizes 
numerous circumstances where government-sponsored displays with 
religious content would not violate the Establishment Clause. The inclusion 
of secular figures as well as religious leaders may neutralize the message of 
a display.226 The presentation of clearly religious works of art in a public 
museum reflects the quality of the work, not the content of the painting or 
sculpture.227 State action that acknowledges “the religious beliefs and 
practices of the American people” is not intrinsically unconstitutional.228 
 
217  Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
218  See id. at 642. 
219  Id. at 642–43. 
220  Id. at 643. 
221  Id. at 649–50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
222  Id. at 650. 
223  Id. at 652. 
224  See id. at 653–54. 
225  Id. at 653. 
226  See id. at 652–53. 
227  See id. at 653. 
228  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
106:605  (2012) Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue 
 643 
Historical documents with religious content may be publicly displayed.229 
There may be a place for ceremonial deism.230 Religious statements by 
public officials may reflect the permissible personal statements of 
individuals rather than the voice of the government.231 
This list is not exclusive, nor could it be. Given the history, culture, 
and religious demography of the United States, questions regarding the 
constitutionality of religious displays and messages will always involve 
some significant level of uncertainty. That reality does not necessarily 
undermine Justice Stevens’s insistence on a strong presumption that 
government-sponsored religious displays violate the Establishment Clause. 
This comparison between the ambiguities of the endorsement test and the 
uncertainty intrinsic to free exercise balancing, however, raises questions 
about whether both constitutional inquiries are equally problematic, and, 
accordingly, whether they both should be equally acceptable or 
unacceptable for religion clause purposes.232 
b. Subjective balancing is unavoidable.—Another open area of 
inquiry involves a more fundamental challenge to the antibalancing 
arguments that are so intrinsic to the reasoning of the Smith II decision, and, 
perhaps, to Justice Stevens’s free exercise jurisprudence. The challenge to 
the judicial competence and propriety arguments set out in Smith II extends 
beyond the argument that applying the endorsement test in religious display 
and public prayer cases involves a similar degree of subjectivity and 
balancing as the adjudication of free exercise claims for exemptions from 
neutral laws of general applicability. What if the review of discretionary 
accommodations of religion under Establishment Clause auspices required 
the Court to engage in the same kind of subjective, unpredictable, and 
value-laden balancing of religious liberty and state interests that the 
majority opinion in Smith II so forcefully rejected for the adjudication of 
free exercise claims? 
Part III of this Article identified two principles that Justice Stevens 
considered in determining whether a discretionary accommodation of 
religion violated the Establishment Clause. First, some accommodations 
violate religious equality principles and provide exemptions to preferred 
 
229  Id. 
230  See id. at 711, 723; supra note 197. The idea and scope of ceremonial deism remains 
controversial. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious 
Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1574–83 (2010); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality 
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2137–54 (1996). 
231  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
232  See generally Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why 
the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are 
Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1721–24 (2011) (arguing 
that the applications of the endorsement and free exercise balancing tests are equally vulnerable to the 
criticism that they involve subjective and indeterminate decisionmaking by the judiciary). 
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faiths while denying comparable exemptions sought by other religions.233 
Second, some accommodations simply go too far and unfairly privilege 
religion at the expense of third parties, nonbelievers, and the general 
public.234 I agree that these are both important Establishment Clause 
constraints on the constitutionality of accommodations. I also suggest, 
however, that it is difficult to enforce either principle without engaging in 
the same kind of subjective, indeterminate, and value-laden balancing 
analysis that the Court identified as a primary reason for substantially 
limiting the scope of free exercise rights in Smith II. 
Consider how a court can determine whether a legislative 
accommodation violates equality principles by impermissibly preferring 
some faiths over others. Some cases, of course, would be easy to resolve. 
Assume a state law allows Jewish students attending public school to be 
excused from the state’s compulsory attendance requirements on religious 
holidays but denies Buddhist and Hindu students a comparable 
accommodation. That is an easy law to invalidate under the Establishment 
Clause, but it is extremely unlikely that a blatantly discriminatory law like 
this one would be enacted in the first place. 
Now consider a more common kind of a case. The federal government 
for many years has exempted the Native American Church (and more 
recently the members of all recognized Indian tribes) from the ban on using 
peyote imposed by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).235 Reasoning by 
analogy from that exemption, members of other faiths argued that they 
should be relieved of the obligations of the CSA that prevent them from 
using other prohibited substances in their religious rituals. Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church members, Rastafarians, and others demanded an 
accommodation for the use of marijuana.236 Members of other faiths have 
 
233  See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
234  See supra notes 154–62 and accompanying text. 
235  42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006). 
236  See, e.g., Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that federal 
court is compelled to adjudicate a claim of denominational preference based on allowing an exemption 
for religious use of peyote by Native American Church members while denying an exemption for 
religious use of marijuana by Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church members); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652, 
653 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (confirming the conviction of a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic 
Church for possession of marijuana); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying 
a religious exemption to controlled substances laws for members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); 
McBride v. Shawnee Cnty., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100–01 (D. Kan. 1999) (recognizing that a state 
cannot treat Rastafarian religion less favorably than the Native American Church if both religions are 
similarly situated, but concluding that they are not). 
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sought237 and may well seek exemptions for the ritual use of other restricted 
substances. How should a court go about evaluating these claims?238 
There is no mystery here as to the kind of analysis courts apply to these 
claims. Indeed, these kinds of arguments have been raised and adjudicated 
on several occasions by lower courts. In most cases, courts evaluate the 
state’s interest in denying the sought-after accommodation to determine if it 
is substantially different and more important than the state’s interest in 
restricting access to peyote by Native Americans.239 For example, an 
exemption for the religious use of peyote might be more easily controlled 
and less burdensome to law enforcement than exemptions for the religious 
use of marijuana.240 
Courts consider these and other arguments to determine if the costs to 
society of granting an exemption for the religious use of marijuana justify 
the different treatment provided to the two controlled substances. If the 
costs are sufficiently different, the courts will distinguish the state’s interest 
in these two situations and reject the claim for an accommodation for the 
religious use of marijuana.241 Just how much of a difference between the 
costs of the two accommodations being compared to each other will justify 
treating them differently is necessarily an open and subjective inquiry. 
This kind of an inquiry, however, bears an uncomfortable resemblance 
to the balancing analysis that the majority opinion in Smith II deplores. 
Balancing tests in free exercise cases do not weigh the value of one 
religious practice over another.242 Once a court concludes that the right is 
burdened or abridged, the court’s focus is almost always on the nature and 
importance of the state’s interest that conflicts with the exercise of a right. It 
will evaluate the sufficiency and importance of the state’s interest and 
whether alternative regulations are available that would adequately further 
that interest while imposing a less serious burden on the exercise of the 
 
237  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425–26 
(2006) (arguing for an exemption for hoasca tea under RFRA). 
238  While courts sometimes construed these arguments to raise equal protection claims, they are 
more appropriately evaluated under the Establishment Clause. See Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d at 1468 
(Buckley, J., dissenting). 
239  See, e.g., id. at 1462–63 (majority opinion); Rush, 738 F.2d at 512–13; McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1100–02. But see Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (N.D. Tex. 
1988) (finding no need to compare the state interest in prohibiting other religious groups from using 
peyote because the Native American Church exemption is unique). 
240  Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d at 1463 (distinguishing availability and risk of abuse of marijuana from 
availability and risk of abuse of peyote); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d at 653 (distinguishing ceremonial use 
of peyote in “controlled and isolated circumstances” with “Coptic Church members’ continuous and 
public use of marijuana”); Rush, 738 F.2d at 513 (distinguishing the burden on law enforcement 
resulting from exemptions for peyote and marijuana); McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1101–02 
(distinguishing marijuana and peyote exemptions in terms of enforcement difficulties and risk of abuse). 
241  See cases cited supra note 240. 
242  See Smith II, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (explaining that it is inappropriate and beyond their 
competence for courts to evaluate the centrality or merits of different religious claims). 
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right.243 That is a pretty fair description of the analysis a court employs to 
determine whether the granting of one religious accommodation but not 
another constitutes unconstitutional preferentialism in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
One might argue that the Establishment Clause inquiry is less 
subjective, indeterminate, and value laden than a free exercise balancing 
test. Reviewing the constitutionality of an accommodation on equality 
grounds requires a comparison between prior exemptions that were granted 
and current law that fails to include an accommodation in arguably similar 
circumstances. The application of rigorous scrutiny in a free exercise case 
involves an ad hoc and independent weighing of the state’s interest against 
the value of religious freedom to the individual asserting the claim. 
Balancing is a more open-ended inquiry than a comparative analysis. 
The difference between these two forms of review may be much more 
modest than this argument suggests, however. As noted, most of what a 
court weighs when it applies a balancing test is focused on the state’s side 
of the scale. Moreover, American constitutional law cases depend on 
reasoning by analogy whether the court is comparing one religious 
accommodation against another or balancing the state’s interest against the 
claimant’s free exercise right. In reviewing free exercise claims for 
constitutionally mandated accommodations, the history of prior regulations 
and decisions granting or denying sought-after accommodations will form 
the foundation for legal argument in cases asserting new claims.244 The 
analysis courts employ in an Establishment Clause case involving 
discretionary accommodations is substantially similar. Once a state grants 
or refuses to grant a discretionary accommodation to a religious group for a 
particular practice, courts will compare the cost or risks associated with that 
decision to other accommodation decisions in evaluating claims of 
favoritism or discriminatory treatment.245 Whether the court is protecting 
 
243  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982) (focusing on importance of state 
interest and extent to which religious exemption will interfere with it); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 
818–19 (Cal. 1964). 
244  See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701–08 (1986) (discussing prior free exercise cases and 
accommodation statutes in evaluating plaintiff’s free exercise claim); United States v. Middleton, 690 
F.2d 820, 824–25 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument analogizing an Amish community’s 
religious liberty interest in controlling the education of their children, upheld in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972), to a Coptic community’s liberty interest in the religious use of marijuana because of 
the “difference in the nature of the governmental interests involved in the two cases”). Indeed, it is not 
uncommon for courts to adjudicate claims of religious discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause 
rather than the Establishment Clause because the analysis is so similar in both cases. See, e.g., Town v. 
Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 1979). 
245  See supra notes 239–43. Judge Buckley’s dissenting opinion in Olsen v. DEA provides a 
particularly effective illustration of how these cases should be reviewed. 878 F. 2d at 1468–72 (Buckley, 
J., dissenting); see also In re Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 177, 181–83 (N.C. 1998) (distinguishing the 
tax exemption for religiously affiliated homes for the aged, sick, and infirm from the tax exemption for 
all houses of worship upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). 
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religious liberty in a free exercise case or enforcing religious equality under 
the Establishment Clause, some form of a comparative weighing of the 
state’s interest is likely to be a significant part of its reasoning. If that 
analysis is unacceptably unpredictable and subjective, it is likely to be 
vulnerable to that criticism in both kinds of cases, not just in free exercise 
litigation. 
An even stronger argument about the unavoidability of subjective 
inquiries akin to balancing in accommodation cases applies in cases in 
which an accommodation is challenged on the ground that it extends too far 
and burdens nonbeneficiaries to an unacceptable extent. Consider the words 
used by the Court to describe this constitutional constraint. The Court 
invalidates accommodations that assign an “unyielding weighting in favor 
of [religious accommodations] over all other interests . . . .”246 If this 
language means that a discretionary accommodation of religious exercise 
must be susceptible to being outweighed by countervailing state interests, it 
would seem to require some form of balancing analysis to determine if a 
challenged accommodation withstands Establishment Clause review. 
Alternatively, the Court questions whether an accommodation would 
be constitutional if it “burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly.”247 Most 
recently, the Court concluded that to avoid an as-applied challenge under 
the Establishment Clause, a general accommodation statute “must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose 
on nonbeneficiaries . . . .”248 In addition, accommodations may not be 
“excessive” or “jeopardize the effective functioning of an 
institution . . . .”249 Certainly, one may argue that these vague standards are 
as subjective and indeterminate as the application of strict scrutiny review 
to a neutral law of general applicability that substantially burdens the 
exercise of religion. 
Indeed, the indeterminate nature of the Court’s review of religious 
accommodations under the Establishment Clause can be demonstrated not 
only by reference to what the Court says in its opinions, but also in the 
diversity of its holdings. Over the last forty years, the Court struck down 
religious accommodations in Texas Monthly,250 Estate of Thornton,251 Kiryas 
Joel,252 and Larson253 on Establishment Clause grounds. It has upheld 
 
246  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985). 
247  Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989). 
248  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
249  Id. at 726. 
250  489 U.S. at 5 (striking a Texas law that exempted religious periodicals from sales tax). 
251  472 U.S. at 708–11 (striking a Connecticut law that gave Sabbath observers an absolute and 
unqualified right to not work on their day of Sabbath).  
252  512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (striking a New York law that carved out a special school district for 
an enclave of a religious group). 
253  456 U.S. 228, 230, 255 (1982) (striking a Minnesota statute that imposed requirements on 
religious groups that solicited nonmembers for over half of their funds).  
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accommodations in Gillette v. United States,254 Amos,255 and Cutter.256 
Justice Stevens wasn’t on the Court when Gillette was decided, but the 
overall point here extends beyond Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence. It is 
extremely difficult to reconcile the holdings of these cases in terms of the 
burdens the accommodations impose on nonbeneficiaries or the degree to 
which they favor some faiths over others.257  
C. The Isolation of Disfavored Minority Faiths 
The foregoing discussion focused on the justifications for free exercise 
doctrine that rejects constitutionally mandated exemptions. It attempted to 
present an ongoing and continuing dialogue on challenges to this approach 
using the constitutional values Justice Stevens has recognized in the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause opinions he has written and joined to 
guide the conversation. There is no concluding resolution to this kind of a 
discussion. The arguments back and forth could continue well beyond the 
pages allocated for this symposium issue. 
However, there is another argument about free exercise exemptions 
that has not been covered yet that merits some additional discussion. The 
constitutional framework addressed so far examines the costs of a regime 
that rejects all constitutionally mandated exemptions. But there may be 
uniquely problematic costs resulting from a more rigorous free exercise 
doctrine that requires exemptions in some cases but not others. The 
argument here in support of Justice Stevens’s equality-based, free exercise 
jurisprudence has considerable persuasive power. No plausible free exercise 
standard of review will require accommodations in all cases. The number of 
 
254  401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (upholding a conscription law as neutral and secular). 
255  483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987) (upholding a section of the Civil Rights Act that “exempt[ed] religious 
organizations from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of 
religion”). 
256  544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (upholding the institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA). 
257  The Title VII amendments allowing religious organizations to discriminate in hiring, upheld in 
Amos, for example, may result in nonbeneficiaries suffering severe burdens. The plaintiff in Amos lost a 
job that he had held for sixteen years. 483 U.S. at 330. In Texas Monthly, the cost to taxpayers of 
granting a sales tax exemption to the publishers of religious books and periodicals may be difficult to 
quantify, but at worst, it imposed a very modest burden on their finances. See 489 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1989). 
Yet the accommodation in Amos was upheld and the exemption in Texas Monthly struck down. In 
Larson, the Court struck down under strict scrutiny an exemption from a registration and reporting 
requirement that applied only to religious charities receiving less than 50% of their contributions from 
members or affiliated organizations on the grounds that it favored some faiths over others. 456 U.S. at 
246–255. In Gillette, however, the Court upheld under relatively lenient review a conscientious objector 
statute that exempted religious pacifists who opposed all wars (e.g., Quakers) from military conscription 
but provided no accommodation to pacifists religiously opposed to unjust wars (e.g., Catholics). 401 
U.S. at 436–37. Given the obvious and predictable discriminatory impact of the accommodation 
challenged in Gillette, the difference in treatment afforded the two laws is difficult to explain. See 
generally MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 185, 246–51 (identifying, but providing no answers to, the 
problems in understanding and reconciling some of these accommodation cases). 
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claims that will be rejected may vary with the rigor of the review applied. 
Whatever standard of review is employed, however, in some circumstances 
the state’s interests will outweigh the free exercise rights of the religious 
claimant.   
The results of such litigation may leave some minority faiths in a more 
painful situation than they would have been in under the regime created in 
Smith II that rejects all claims—regardless of the religious practice at issue 
or the insubstantiality of the state’s interest. Put simply, any attempt to 
protect religious liberty through some kind of balancing analysis will help 
some minority faiths but at the cost of increasing the injury to other small 
religions, unconventional religions, or both. The granting of 
accommodations to some faiths and not others will increase the sense of 
isolation and ill-treatment experienced by those minority faiths denied an 
exemption. Whatever feelings of discrimination and disfavored status a 
minority faith may experience if its claim for an accommodation is rejected 
will be magnified substantially if other small faiths receive exemptions for 
their religious practices. It is bad enough to be treated less favorably than 
the majority. It is far worse to be singled out as one of the few minority 
faiths that are undeserving of accommodation. 
An illustration of the burden of being singled out among minorities for 
disfavored treatment, although not in the context of an exemption from 
general laws, can be found in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Simpson v. 
Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors.258 Simpson involved a County 
Board of Supervisors policy requiring the offering of a “non-sectarian 
invocation” before the Board began its legislative sessions.259 In 
administering the offering of these invocations, the Board’s clerk invited 
clergy and leaders from all of the religious congregations in the county to 
participate in its program.260 Clergy who responded affirmatively to this 
invitation were scheduled to offer the invocation on a first-come, first-serve 
basis.261 
When Cynthia Simpson, a spiritual leader of the Wicca religion, asked 
to be included on the list of religious leaders scheduled to offer the 
invocation, however, the Board refused to permit her to do so262—ostensibly 
because she was not a member of a monotheistic congregation. Simpson 
sued alleging a violation of both of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment.263 A Fourth Circuit panel upheld the county’s policy.264 
 
258  404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005). 
259  Id. at 278. 
260  Id. at 279. 
261  Id. 
262  Id. at 279–80. 
263  Id. at 280. 
264  Id. at 288. 
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There are many things wrong with the court’s opinion in the Simpson 
case. But the greatest defect is the court’s inability to understand why the 
county’s policy was constitutionally objectionable. The court noted that in 
Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to the state legislature of Nebraska’s hiring of a Presbyterian 
minister to serve as legislative chaplain and to open each session of the 
legislature with a prayer.265 The same Presbyterian minister had held the 
position for sixteen years.266 To the Fourth Circuit panel in Simpson, 
Chesterfield County’s policy was “in many ways more inclusive than that 
approved by the Marsh Court.”267 Indeed, the court explained, “[i]n contrast 
to Marsh’s single Presbyterian clergyman, the County welcomes rabbis, 
imams, priests, pastors, and ministers. Chesterfield not only sought but 
achieved diversity. Its first-come, first-serve system led to prayers being 
given by a wide cross-section of the County’s religious leaders.”268 
Simpson’s attempt to interpret “the County’s inclusiveness as a negative” 
simply made no sense to the court.269 
I am confident that Justice Stevens would have had little difficulty in 
understanding both the power and the merits of Simpson’s claim and in 
rejecting the myopic understanding of Establishment Clause concerns 
exhibited by the Fourth Circuit panel. While the appointment of a minister 
from one Protestant denomination as legislative chaplain for sixteen years 
may be problematic, the harm caused by such religious favoritism is fairly 
widespread. In 2000, there were 39,000 Presbyterians in Nebraska who 
attended church services out of a total population of 1,000,000 church-
goers.270 It would be difficult to argue that the overwhelming majority of 
religious non-Protestant Nebraskans experienced the legislature’s decision 
as directly deprecating their faith. Surely, a policy that permitted members 
of the clergy of any denomination to serve as legislative chaplain except 
Presbyterians would communicate a very different and more invidious and 
hurtful message. The Chesterfield County policy communicated just such a 
message of exclusion and unworthiness to Ms. Simpson and her co-
religionists. The experience of being the only religion denied the 
opportunity to offer a prayer at legislative sessions—an opportunity 
provided to a host of other religious leaders and congregations—is 
distinctively alienating and oppressive. Justice Stevens’s concerns about the 
state accommodating some religions but not others271 reflects his 
 
265  463 U.S. 783, 792–95 (1983). 
266  Id. at 793. 
267  404 F.3d at 285. 
268  Id. 
269  Id. at 286. 
270  See State Membership Report: Nebraska, Denominational Groups, 2000, ASS’N RELIGION DATA 
ARCHIVES, http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/state/31_2000.asp (last visited June 30, 2012). 
271  See supra Part II and notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
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appreciation of the uniquely stigmatizing consequences that this kind of 
unequal treatment may inflict on minority faiths. 
As the above discussion illustrates, allowing courts, the political 
branches of government, or both to grant religious accommodations not 
only risks decisions based on religious familiarity and favoritism, but may 
also substantially magnify the injury experienced by minority faiths whose 
claims for exemptions from neutral laws are denied. These risks and costs 
are real, but there is an additional and arguably offsetting value to requiring 
religious exemptions in appropriate cases that needs to be taken into 
account as well. Granting judicial or legislative accommodations to some 
faiths may well create risks of increased isolation for small and less well-
known religions, but it also provides legal tools to minority faiths that they 
may use to their advantage. Once an accommodation is granted to one faith, 
the decision to do so becomes a wedge that other faiths may employ to pry 
open the door to additional exemptions. 
If either a court or a legislature determines that an exemption from a 
neutral law for one religious practice does not unacceptably interfere with 
the state’s interest furthered by the law, the fact of that exemption 
necessarily undermines the government’s ability to assert that same state 
interest as a justification for denying exemptions for other religious 
practices. The Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez v. O Centro Espírita 
Beneficente União do Vegetal persuasively illustrates the utility of pointing 
to prior exemptions in arguing against the state’s justifications for denying 
accommodations.272 Although O Centro involved a statutory claim under the 
RFRA rather than a free exercise claim, the statutory standard required by 
the federal law, strict scrutiny, was the same standard of review applied in 
many fundamental rights cases and pre-Smith free exercise cases. 
At issue in O Centro was an RFRA claim brought by a very small 
religious sect, O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (UDV), 
seeking to enjoin the federal government from interfering with their use of 
hoasca, a sacramental tea, in religious rituals.273 Hoasca tea contains a 
hallucinogen, the possession and use of which is prohibited by the CSA.274 
In defending its refusal to exempt the religious use of hoasca tea from the 
requirements of the CSA, the government argued that hoasca tea “has a 
high potential for abuse” and that individuals ingesting the drug are exposed 
to serious health risks.275 
In rejecting the government’s argument, the Court noted that very 
similar risks exist with regard to the ingestion of mescaline, an ingredient in 
 
272  546 U.S. 418, 433–36 (2006). 
273  Id. at 425–26. 
274  Id. at 425 (explaining that hoasca tea contains dimethyltryptamine, which is listed in Schedule 
I(c) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006)). 
275  Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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peyote.276 Yet the federal government granted an exemption for the religious 
use of peyote to Native Americans.277 Thus, the Court wondered: 
[i]f such use is permitted . . . for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans 
practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can 
preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American 
members of the UDV who want to practice theirs.278  
Similarly, when the government argued “that the effectiveness of the 
Controlled Substances Act will be ‘necessarily . . . undercut’ if the Act is 
not uniformly applied,” the Court was not persuaded.279 “The peyote 
exception,” it pointed out, “has been in place since the outset of the 
Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has ‘undercut’ 
the Government’s ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by non-
Indians.”280 
The Court’s analysis in O Centro is neither surprising nor 
unconventional. Existing religious accommodations are an intrinsic part of 
the framework of law and fact through which the denial of other claims for 
accommodation will be vetted.281 Few arguments could be more effective in 
challenging the denial of a requested accommodation than a reference to 
other accommodations granted by the state to which a meaningful analogy 
can be drawn. 
A related, but less precise, example may also help to illustrate the costs 
and benefits of a policy providing accommodations to religious groups. In 
Board of Education v. Mergens, the Court interpreted the federal Equal 
Access Act and upheld its application against an Establishment Clause 
challenge.282 The goal of the Equal Access Act was to prevent public 
secondary schools from denying student religious groups access to school 
property for religious meetings.283 To accomplish this objective, the Act 
provided that public secondary schools receiving federal financial support 
which permit “one or more noncurriculum related students groups to meet 
on school premises” may not deny equal access to other student groups 
because of the religious, political, or philosophical content of the student 
groups’ programs.284 The Court interpreted the Act broadly to apply to any 
school that permitted student groups not directly related to the school’s 
curriculum, such as the chess club, to hold meetings on school property.285 
 
276  Id. 
277  Id. 
278  Id. 
279  Id. at 434–35 (alteration in original). 
280  Id. 
281  See supra notes 236–44 and accompanying text. 
282  496 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1990). 
283  See id. at 235. 
284  20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (2006). 
285  See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240. 
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Because the student religious clubs at issue were not created, sponsored, or 
controlled by the school, permitting them to meet on school property did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.286 
Justice Stevens dissented, challenging the majority’s interpretation of 
the Act. Justice Stevens argued that the purpose of the law was to prohibit 
schools which permitted student groups advocating “partisan theological, 
political, or ethical views” to meet on school premises from discriminating 
among the advocacy clubs seeking access on the basis of the content of 
their views.287 Such a law would conform to the Court’s forum analysis and 
would not raise serious Establishment Clause issues.288 Under the Court’s 
construction of the Act, however, the Equal Access Act would require 
public schools to allow student religious clubs to hold meetings on school 
property even when the school’s policy had been to deny access to 
controversial, partisan advocacy groups. This interpretation of the law 
provided religious clubs a special accommodation that raised serious 
Establishment Clause questions about the secular purpose of the law and 
whether its effect impermissibly advanced religion—although these 
concerns probably did not require the invalidation of the Act.289 
Justice Stevens focused on the negative burdens imposed by the Act on 
schools that had no intention of creating forums for student advocacy 
groups on school property. In order to limit access to religious advocacy 
groups, he suggested, schools would have to close their doors to “familiar 
and innocuous activities” such as the chess club or a cheerleader squad.290 
Thus, the Act, under the majority’s analysis, “comes perilously close to an 
outright command to allow organized prayer, and perhaps . . . religious 
ceremonies . . . on school premises.”291 
While the goal of the Equal Access Act may have focused on 
providing religious clubs greater opportunities to meet on school premises, 
the implementation of the Act over time had far broader consequences. 
Student gay–straight alliance clubs have used the statutory prohibition 
against discrimination to support their claim to access to school premises.292 
At least one commentator has suggested that gay–straight alliances in 
public high schools have been the biggest “beneficiary of the Equal Access 
 
286  See id. at 251–53. 
287  Id. at 276. 
288  See id. at 276–80. 
289  See id. at 288. 
290  Id. at 286–87. 
291  Id. at 287. 
292  See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Stretching the Equal Access Act Beyond Equal Access, 27 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 273, 309–11 (2003); Nicolyn Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or Gays’ Schools? The 
Dilemma of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 192–96 
(2004). 
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Act . . . .”293 Student atheist clubs have also used the Act to seek access to 
school premises.294 Thus, an accommodation adopted to provide access for 
religious groups led unexpectedly to equal access for many other 
organizations that were not the intended beneficiaries of the statute. Just as 
an accommodation of one religion may open the door for accommodations 
for other faiths, the accommodation of religion generally may open the door 
for accommodations for nonreligious individuals or groups as well.295 
These examples do not dispute the concern that the granting of specific 
accommodations by either the courts or the legislatures risks the increased 
isolation and alienation of particular faiths. That possibility cannot be 
lightly dismissed. It is also true, however, that the granting of 
accommodations to more familiar and accepted minority faiths may provide 
the best, and perhaps the only, foundation for other religious minorities to 
persuasively argue their own religious liberty claim. Even a generic 
accommodation for religion may help nonreligious groups to obtain 
opportunities or exemptions that would otherwise be unavailable to them. 
Of course, weighing the risk of increased isolation against the opportunity 
for increased accommodation over time is not a calculation that can be 
performed with any degree of accuracy. But that is the point here. Judicial 
and legislative accommodations of religious groups create both risks and 
opportunities for other faiths. That uncertainty suggests that it is hard to 
generalize about the costs and benefits for religious equality of a regime 
that is open to the granting of religious accommodations. The argument that 
the granting of some accommodations increases inequality and stigma 
rather than reducing it invites further discussion as the constitutional 
dialogue continues. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Stevens was a formidable presence on the United States 
Supreme Court for over three decades. His views on the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment represent a significant part of his constitutional law 
jurisprudence. During his tenure, Justice Stevens had few peers on the 
Court that could match his commitment to the rigorous enforcement of 
Establishment Clause guarantees. Justice Stevens was also well known for 
arguing that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect religious individuals 
or institutions against neutral laws of general applicability—a position that 
eventually commanded the support of a majority of the court. 
 
293  Joan W. Howarth, Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 889, 937 (2009). 
294  E.g., Michael Winerip, Teenagers Speak Up for Lack of Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at 
A12. 
295  See e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (holding that conscientious objector 
status must be available to an individual whose sincere pacifist beliefs occupies the same place in his life 
that the belief in God occupies for an individual who qualifies for the exemption). 
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The ostensible dissonance between Justice Stevens’s expansive 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and his much more limited 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause rests on a unifying foundation—
Justice Stevens’s concerns about religious equality. To Justice Stevens, the 
Establishment Clause requirement that laws must further a secular purpose 
served as a check on state action that impermissibly favored majoritarian 
religious beliefs. In a similar vein, Justice Stevens insisted that state-
sponsored public prayer and religious displays violated the Establishment 
Clause because they offended religious minorities and nonbelievers and 
undermined their status in the community. 
Justice Stevens’s reluctance to permit free exercise challenges against 
neutral laws of general applicability was also grounded in concerns about 
religious equality. If the federal courts adjudicated free exercise claims, 
they would end up, inevitably, protecting the practices of certain faiths but 
not others. Balancing state interests against free exercise was an 
intrinsically subjective and value-laden process that exceeded both the 
competence and the legitimate role of federal judges. To Justice Stevens, 
the inequality of results intrinsic to such an adjudicatory mechanism was 
constitutionally unacceptable. 
What we can learn about Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the religion 
clauses, gleaned from the many opinions he authored or joined, raises as 
many questions as it answers, however. One may argue, for example, with 
considerable persuasive force, that many neutral laws of general 
applicability are drafted to avoid conflicts with the practices of large and 
politically powerful faiths. Accordingly, denying religious accommodations 
to minority faiths burdened by such laws will result in the very same 
inequality of treatment between majority and minority faiths that Justice 
Stevens so frequently and eloquently condemned in his Establishment 
Clause opinions. Indeed, the alienation and marginalization experienced by 
religious minorities whose ability to practice their faith is burdened by 
general laws may be as severe as any affront they experience from public 
prayers or religious displays that favor other religions. 
Alternative reasons for denying all free exercise claims against neutral 
laws of general applicability are subject to serious challenges as well. The 
subjectivity inherent in free exercise balancing may be no more subjective 
and unpredictable than the task of determining when state-sponsored 
prayers and religious displays impermissibly endorse religion—a judicial 
function that Justice Stevens repeatedly supported. Indeed, it is not even 
clear that assigning the problem of granting or denying religious 
accommodations to the political branches of government frees the judiciary 
from value-laden and indeterminate inquiries into accommodation disputes. 
Justice Stevens insisted that the Establishment Clause required federal 
judicial evaluation of discretionary accommodations to determine if such 
exemptions favored some faiths over others and whether they imposed 
unfair and excessive burdens on nonbeneficiaries. These tasks, however, 
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involve the same kind of subjective and open-ended analysis that the Court, 
with Justice Stevens’s assent, condemned in free exercise cases. 
Ultimately, these and other questions remain unanswered and are open 
to ongoing analysis and debate. The final chapters of Justice Stevens’s 
jurisprudence were not completed when he retired from the Court. They are 
still being written in scholarly discussions in this symposium and other 
sources. The discussion of the jurisprudence of great Supreme Court 
Justices continues far beyond their tenure on the Court. 
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